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SHARING, SAMPLES, AND GENERICS:
AN ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK
Michael A. Carrier†
Rising drug prices are in the news.  By increasing price,
drug companies have placed vital, even life-saving, medicines
out of the reach of consumers.  In a recent development, brand
firms have prevented generics even from entering the market.
The ruse for this strategy involves risk-management programs
known as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (“REMS”).
Pursuant to legislation enacted in 2007, the FDA requires
REMS when a drug’s risks (such as death or injury) outweigh
its rewards.  Brands have used this regime, intended to bring
drugs to the market, to block generic competition.  Regulations
such as the federal Hatch-Waxman Act and state substitution
laws foster widespread generic competition.  But these re-
gimes can only be effectuated through generic entry.  And that
entry can take place only if a generic can use a brand’s sam-
ple to show that its product is equivalent.
More than 100 generic firms have complained that they
have not been able to access needed samples.  One study of
40 drugs subject to restricted access programs found that
generics’ inability to enter cost more than $5 billion a year.
Brand firms have contended that antitrust law does not com-
pel them to deal with their competitors and have highlighted
concerns related to safety and product liability in justifying
their refusals.  This Article rebuts these claims.  It highlights
the importance of samples in the regulatory regime and the
FDA’s inability to address the issue.  It shows how a sharing
requirement in this setting is consistent with Supreme Court
caselaw.  And it demonstrates that the brands’ behavior fails
the defendant-friendly “no economic sense” test because the
conduct literally makes no sense other than by harming
generics.
Brands’ denial of samples offers a textbook case of mo-
nopolization.  In the universe of pharmaceutical antitrust be-
havior, other conduct—such as “pay for delay” settlements
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between brands and generics and “product hopping” from one
drug to a slightly modified version—has received the lion’s
share of attention.  But sample denials are overdue for anti-
trust scrutiny.  This Article fills this gap.  Given the failure of
Congress and the FDA to remedy the issue, antitrust can play
a crucial role in ensuring generic access to samples, affirming
a linchpin of the pharmaceutical regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Rising drug prices are in the news.  By increasing price,
drug companies have placed vital, sometimes life-saving,
medicines out of the reach of consumers.  In a recent develop-
ment, brand firms have prevented generics even from entering
the market.  The ruse for this strategy involves risk-manage-
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ment programs known as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies (“REMS”).  Pursuant to legislation enacted in 2007,
the FDA requires REMS when a drug’s risks (such as death or
injury) outweigh its rewards.  Brands have used this regime,
intended to bring drugs to the market, to block generic compe-
tition.  Regulations such as the federal Hatch-Waxman Act1
and state substitution laws foster widespread generic competi-
tion.  But these regimes can only be effectuated through ge-
neric entry.  And that entry can take place only if a generic can
use a brand’s sample to show that its product is equivalent.
More than 100 generic firms have complained that they
have not been able to access needed samples.2  One study of 40
drugs subject to restricted access programs found that gener-
ics’ inability to enter increased U.S. healthcare costs by more
than $5 billion a year.3  As a leading FDA official lamented,
brands “feel it’s their duty to their stockholders to delay compe-
tition as long as possible.”4
Brand firms have contended that antitrust law does not
compel them to deal with their competitors and have high-
lighted concerns related to safety and product liability in justi-
fying their refusals.  This Article rebuts these claims.  It
highlights the importance of samples in the regulatory regime
and the FDA’s inability to address the issue.  It shows how a
sharing requirement in this setting is consistent with Supreme
Court caselaw.  And it demonstrates that the brands’ behavior
fails the defendant-friendly “no economic sense” test because
1 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
2 Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), The Creating and Restoring
Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act of 2016: Preventing Abusive
Tactics that Delay the Creation of Affordable Generic Drugs (June 14, 2016),
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/creates-act-one-pager [https://
perma.cc/JJ2Z-EW3W].
3 See ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOB. ADVISORS, LOST PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAVINGS
FROM USE OF REMS PROGRAMS TO DELAY GENERIC MARKET ENTRY 1 (2014).
4 David Gaugh, Strengthening REMS for Patient Safety and Faster Access to
Generics, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2016, 8:01 AM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/276494-strengthening-rems-for-patient-safety-
and-faster-access-to [https://perma.cc/2TKL-T9SM]. See also The CREATES Act:
Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Drug Price Compe-
tition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy & Consumer
Rights, S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong., at 1:20:08 (2016), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?411609-1/creates-act-ending-regulatory-abuse-protecting-con-
sumers-ensuring-drug-price-competition [https://perma.cc/QH2J-ARJT]  (re-
jecting claim that REMS denials are merely an example of “lifecycle management”
and contending instead that they are “blatantly anti-competitive” (statement of
Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT)).
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the conduct literally makes no sense other than by harming
generics.
Part I provides a background on REMS, offering a history
and overview before examining the concern of blocked generic
entry.  Part II presents the caselaw, which is still developing,
with opinions issued primarily in the setting of motions to dis-
miss.  Part III outlines the relevant framework for the most
appropriate antitrust case: a monopolization claim under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.  It addresses monopoly power, the
regulatory regime, and exclusionary conduct, the latter in the
setting of refusals to deal and through a lens that analyzes
whether the conduct makes economic sense.
Part IV then applies this new antitrust framework, showing
how the denial of samples and failure to participate in shared
REMS programs each can violate antitrust law because they
tend to lack economic sense other than by harming generic
competition.  Part V concludes by rebutting the four justifica-
tions on which brand firms have most frequently relied.  It first
addresses arguments, based on the caselaw, that deny a duty
to deal and reject liability where there is no previous course of
dealing between the parties.  And it then addresses two excuses
based on business concerns about the safety of generic drugs
and increased exposure to product liability claims.
Brands’ denial of samples offers a textbook case of monop-
olization.  In the universe of pharmaceutical antitrust behavior,
other conduct—such as “pay for delay” settlements between
brands and generics5 and “product hopping” from one drug to a
slightly modified version6—has received the lion’s share of at-
tention.  But sample denials are overdue for antitrust scrutiny.
This Article fills this gap.  Given the failure of Congress and the
FDA to remedy the issue, antitrust can play a crucial role in
ensuring generic access to samples, affirming a linchpin of the
pharmaceutical regime.
I
REMS
Courts are beginning to address the antitrust implications
of brand companies’ refusals to share samples of drugs that are
subject to REMS programs.  This Part examines REMS, tracing
its history and requirements, and offering examples.  It then
5 E.g., FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
6 E.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d
638 (2d Cir. 2015).
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provides an overview of generic competition.  Finally, it high-
lights the anticompetitive concern with REMS, which can pre-
vent generic drugs from reaching the market.
A. Background
Beginning with the passage of the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act in 1938, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) has required manufacturers to prove a drug’s safety
before entering the market.7  In the following several decades,
the agency imposed more rigorous requirements for demon-
strating safety and effectiveness.8
In the mid-2000s, the FDA established Risk Minimization
Action Plans (“RiskMAPs”), voluntary systems by which drug
sponsors implemented risk-minimizing plans to address
known risks.9  A RiskMAP is “a strategic safety program de-
signed to meet specific goals and objectives in minimizing
known risks of a product while preserving its benefits.”10
These were developed for products requiring strategies “beyond
describing the risks and benefits of the product in labeling and
performing required safety reporting”11 and formed the precur-
sor to REMS.12
In 2007, Congress enacted the Food and Drug Administra-
tion Amendments Act (“FDAAA”).13  Section 505-1(a)(1) of the
Act authorizes the FDA to require sponsors of drug applica-
7 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (1938) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2012)).
8 See Shashank Upadhye & Braden Lang, The FDA and Patent, Antitrust, and
Property Takings Laws: Strange Bedfellows Useful to Unblock Access to Blocked
Drugs, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 84, 91–92 (2014).
9 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH (CDER),
FORMAT AND CONTENT OF PROPOSED RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
(REMS), REMS ASSESSMENTS, AND PROPOSED REMS MODIFICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY 3 (2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/UCM184128.pdf  [https://
perma.cc/BRN4-ZHP7] [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].
10 Id.
11 Id. (explaining that “[f]or the majority of approved products, labeling and
routine reporting requirements are sufficient to mitigate risks and preserve bene-
fits” but that “[i]n a small number of cases, when additional measures were
needed to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks of the drug, FDA
approved the drug with a RiskMAP”).
12 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STANDARDIZING AND EVALUATING RISK EVALUATION
AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES (REMS) 9 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
UCM415751.pdf [https://perma.cc/57VQ-HF6V] [hereinafter STANDARDIZING
REMS].
13 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), 21
U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1) (Supp. 2016).
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tions14 to submit a proposed REMS if the agency determines
that it is needed to ensure that a drug’s benefits outweigh its
risks.15  By September 2008, holders of drug applications that
the FDA selected for REMS were required to submit a proposed
REMS program.16  The transition to mandatory REMS was not
intended to significantly change the voluntary programs in
place at the time.
The FDA has defined REMS as “required risk management
plans that use risk minimization strategies beyond the profes-
sional labeling to ensure that the benefits of certain prescrip-
tion drugs outweigh their risks.”17  Examples of REMS
requirements include education addressing the risk of serious
infection, certification of healthcare professionals targeting se-
vere allergic reactions, the monitoring of liver damage, and neg-
ative pregnancy tests to address severe birth defects.18
In determining the need for REMS, the FDA considers six
factors: (1) the population size likely to use the drug; (2) the
seriousness of the disease; (3) the drug’s expected benefit; (4)
the expected duration of treatment; (5) the seriousness of ad-
verse effects; and (6) the drug’s novelty.19  The FDA can require
a REMS before a drug enters the market based on known risks
or after the drug has been approved based on new evidence of
risk.20
All REMS must include a timetable for submission of peri-
odic reports to the FDA regarding the REMS program.21  Other
requirements vary depending on the risk profile of the drug and
the need to inform doctors or patients of safety concerns.22
REMS programs differ in their level of restriction.  The “least
restrictive” program includes medication guides for patients
and communication plans for healthcare practitioners.23
14 The requirements apply to brand firms filing new drug applications
(“NDAs”), generics filing abbreviated new drug applications (“ANDAs”), and bio-
logic manufacturers filing biologics license applications (“BLAs”). STANDARDIZING
REMS, supra note 12, at 9. R
15 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1).
16 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 9, at 5. R
17 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RISK EVALUATION & MITIGA-
TION STRATEGIES (REMS) 2, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/UCM328784.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Q9L-D3CH] [hereinafter BRIEF OVERVIEW].
18 Id. at 3, 13.
19 Id. at 6.
20 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(2)(A).
21 STANDARDIZING REMS, supra note 12, at 9; BRIEF OVERVIEW, supra note 17, R
at 17 (noting that timetable “must be at least by 18 months, 3 years, and in the
7th year after the REMS is approved” and “[c]an be eliminated after 3 years”).
22 See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 8, at 92. R
23 Id. at 93.
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More restrictive REMS programs have “Elements To Assure
Safe Use (ETASU),” which can include prescriber experience
requirements, certification systems, patient monitoring or re-
gistration, or controlled distribution.24  These requirements
can restrict a drug’s distribution and affect how it can be sold
to consumers.  ETASU measures are “designed to be compati-
ble with established distribution, procurement, and dispensing
systems for drugs.”25  Even though the requirements affect dis-
tribution, the FDA has sought to ensure that they do not bur-
den patients who “have difficulty accessing health care (such
as patients in rural or medically underserved areas)” or those
with “serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions.”26
Since their enactment in 2007, REMS programs—in partic-
ular, those with ETASU requirements—have become an in-
creasingly prevalent part of the FDA approval process.  40
percent of new drugs have REMS programs,27 and there are
currently 76 approved REMS programs, with 42 of these re-
quiring ETASU measures.28  The prevalence of ETASU require-
ments marks a shift from early REMS programs, which tended
to cover less restrictive medication guides.29  Despite their in-
creasing frequency, a report from the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General ques-
tioned “the overall effectiveness of the REMS program,” with
just 7 of 49 REMS meeting all of their goals.30  An understand-
ing of the competitive effects of REMS-related behavior requires
a brief overview of generic competition.
B. Generic Competition
Generic competition is an indispensable foundation of the
pharmaceutical industry.  Congress enacted the Hatch-Wax-
man Act in 1984 to ensure the provision of “low-cost, generic
drugs for millions of Americans.”31  Generic competition would
save consumers, as well as the federal and state governments,
24 BRIEF OVERVIEW, supra note 17, at 13; Upadhye & Lang, supra note 8, at 94. R
25 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. 2016).
26 Id. § 355-1(f)(2)(C).
27 BRILL, supra note 3, at 2. R
28 Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfm
?event=RemsDetails.page&REMS=17 [https://perma.cc/SNH2-EACQ] (last up-
dated May 26, 2017) [hereinafter Approved REMS].
29 BRILL, supra note 3, at 3. R
30 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-04-
11-00510, FDA LACKS COMPREHENSIVE DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUA-
TION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY 16, 22 (2013).
31 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 8 15-NOV-17 14:39
8 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1
millions of dollars each year.  And it would “do more to contain
the cost of elderly care than perhaps anything else this Con-
gress has passed.”32
The competition policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman
Act were strengthened by state drug product selection (“DPS”)
laws, in effect in all 50 states today, which reduce prices for
consumers.33  These laws allow (and often require) pharma-
cists, absent a doctor’s contrary instructions, to substitute ge-
neric versions of brand-name prescriptions.  The laws are
designed to address the disconnect in the industry between
prescribing doctors, who are not directly responsive to drug
pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not di-
rectly select the prescribed drug.34  In particular, DPS laws
carve out a role for pharmacists, who are much more sensitive
to prices than doctors.35
In the past three decades, the size of the generics market
has burgeoned.36  Making up 19% of the prescription drug
market in 1984, generics now constitute 89%.37  Generics
enter the market at significantly lower prices, with an average
cost 80 to 85 percent lower than that of brand drugs.38  As a
result, brand drugs, which make up only 11% of prescriptions
today, are responsible for 73% of drug spending.39  Between
2006 and 2015, the ten-year savings from generic drugs was
nearly $1.5 trillion.40
Generics can offer substantial savings because they do not
need to replicate brand firms’ expensive and lengthy clinical
32 Id.
33 Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:
The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010).
34 See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., FTC, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION 2–3 (1979).
35 ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, GENERIC SUBSTI-
TUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT
SELECTION LAWS 7 (1985).
36 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2012)).
37 See GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 2016 GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS & ACCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES REPORT 5 (2016) [hereinafter GPHA REPORT]; CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ix (1998).
38 Generic Drug Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGe
nericDrugs/ucm167991.htm [https://perma.cc/NK9P-TL7Q] (last updated Sept.
13, 2016).
39 GPHA REPORT, supra note 37, at 5. R
40 Id. at 6.
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trials.41  As the Supreme Court has confirmed, a central pur-
pose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to “allow a generic competi-
tor to file an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) piggy-
backing on the brand’s [new drug application] NDA.”42  Instead
of “providing independent evidence of safety and efficacy, the
typical ANDA shows that the generic drug has the same active
ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the brand-
name drug,” with such piggybacking “designed to speed the
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market.”43
C. Concern: Blocking Generics
The competition between brands and generics at the heart
of the Hatch-Waxman Act is subject to a prerequisite: the use
of a brand’s sample.44  Generic firms must have access45 to
samples of reference listed drugs46 (which, for ease of refer-
ence, I refer to as brand drugs) to engage in bioequivalence
testing, ensuring that its drug is absorbed into the body at the
same rate as the brand’s drug.47  Such testing requires the
generic applicant to have “access to a sufficient quantity” of the
brand drug “to conduct the necessary comparisons” between
the two.48  Brand firms can stifle generic entry by invoking
their REMS programs to refuse to sell samples of their drugs.
Typically, generics can acquire samples from distributors
or wholesalers.49  But REMS often include “provisions barring
41 See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 5
(2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EY4H-UWXT] [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY].  State substitu-
tion laws also allow generics to avoid marketing and promotion costs.
42 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 404–05
(2012).
43 Id. at 405.
44 E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & CTR.
FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (CDER), GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, HANDLING AND
RETENTION OF BA AND BE TESTING SAMPLES 3 (2004).
45 See CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (prepared statement of Beth R
Zelnick Kaufman).
46 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & CTR. FOR
DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (CDER), HOW TO OBTAIN A LETTER FROM FDA STATING
THAT BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDY PROTOCOLS CONTAIN SAFETY PROTECTIONS COMPARABLE TO
APPLICABLE REMS FOR RLD GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/UCM425662.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE9D-WZAR] [hereinafter HHS,
FDA & CDER REPORT].
47 FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 41, at 5. R
48 HHS, FDA & CDER REPORT, supra note 46, at 2. R
49 See Lauren Battaglia, Risky Conduct with Risk Mitigation Strategies? The
Potential Antitrust Issues Associated with REMS, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONI-
CLE, Mar. 2013, at 26, 28; see also Transcript of Motions Hearing at 52, Actelion
Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-05743 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013),
ECF No. 93 (generic would “vastly prefer[ ]” buying from a “wholesaler, . . . distrib-
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distributors and wholesalers from selling the drug to entities
without approval under the REMS,”50 which result in generics
“turn[ing] to the branded manufacturers themselves to supply
the drug samples directly.”51  When the brands then deny sam-
ples, the generics have no recourse.52  A generic company can-
not use a foreign sample as a substitute because the FDA does
not consider this to be the same drug product for bioe-
quivalence testing purposes.53  And even if a generic has “the
exact recipe of a brand formulation,” it “cannot manufacture its
own version” because only the brand version constitutes the
“reference listed drug” under the Hatch-Waxman Act.54  Absent
access to the brand sample, the generic company cannot
demonstrate bioequivalence and thus can enter the market
only by replicating all of the safety and efficacy evidence for the
drug product, directly contravening the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
objectives.
Congress was keenly aware of the importance of generic
competition when it passed the FDAAA.  In doing so, it included
a provision that made clear that ETASU measures should not
be used to prevent generic firms from accessing samples of
drugs covered by REMS.55  In particular, the statute explicitly
states that “[n]o holder of an approved covered application shall
use any element to assure safe use required by the Secretary
under this subsection to block or delay approval of an applica-
tion.”56  Such language provides not only that brands shall not
utor, or specialty pharmacy” than from a brand); Jose´ P. Sierra, Generics Demand
Brand Drug Samples for ANDA Filings, PHARMARISC.COM (Apr. 11, 2013), http://
www.pharmarisc.com/2013/04/generics-demand-brand-drug-samples-for-
anda-filings/ [https://perma.cc/F8B8-HW7P] (generic firms “[o]rdinarily . . .
purchase” samples “from wholesalers on the open market”).
50 Battaglia, supra note 49, at 28.  For an example, see infra note 88. R
51 Battaglia, supra note 49, at 28. R
52 See, e.g., Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 80 (explaining that R
FDA denied generic’s attempt to address brand’s refusal to provide sample by
acquiring samples of Canadian drug).
53 See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 8, at 112 n.129 (“[R]eference product is R
defined in § 355(j)(7),” which, in referring to “drug products approved under
§ 355(b) and (c),” allows reference only to U.S. products since “[f]oreign approved
products are approved under that country’s law” rather than sections 355(b) and
(c)).
54 Id. at 112. See id. at 111–12 (“FDA-approved brand product must be
accessed and studied” and “[f]oreign reference product is not allowed”).
55 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (Supp. 2016).
56 Id.  The full text reads: “No holder of an approved covered application shall
use any element to assure safe use required by the Secretary under this subsec-
tion to block or delay approval of an application under section 505(b)(2) or (j) [21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) or (j)] or to prevent application of such element under subsec-
tion (i)(1)(B) to a drug that is the subject of an abbreviated new drug application.”
Id.
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use REMS to block generics but also that they shall not use
them to delay generics.57
Congress was concerned that restrictions meant to prevent
risky drugs from reaching consumers could prevent generic
firms from buying samples and bringing those drugs to the
market.58  Senators have criticized brands’ uses of access to
samples to block and delay generics.  In a recent hearing, Sena-
tor Charles Grassley (R-IA) lamented “tactics that appeared to
frustrate the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act,” as brand firms
“were misusing their . . . REMS[ ] to withhold access to drug
samples for bioequivalence testing and generic drug develop-
ment in violation of FDA regulations and the Hatch Waxman
Act.”59  Similarly, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) explained that
“[t]his simple delay tactic uses regulatory safeguards as a
weapon to block competition.”60  Brands need not even refuse
to deal with a generic; instead they “simply engage in never-
ending negotiations that have the effect of delaying entry.”61
57 Earlier legislation would have been even more explicit in clarifying brand
obligations to provide samples to generics for bioequivalence testing. See FDAAA,
H.R. 2900, 110th Cong. § 505-1(f)(6) (2007) (stating that brand must provide “a
sufficient amount of drug to conduct bioequivalence testing” if generic agrees to
distribution restrictions assuring safe use and pays fair market value); S. 3187,
112th Cong. § 1131(k) (as passed by Senate, May 24, 2012) (providing that “no
elements to ensure safe use shall prohibit . . . supply of [a needed] drug . . . for the
purpose of conducting [necessary] testing”).  The failure to include such language
must be viewed in the context of the FDAAA, “vast” legislation that “altered a
significant portion of the FDA’s powers,” Christopher Megaw, Reviving Essential
Facilities to Prevent REMS Abuses, 47 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROBS. 103, 116 (2013),
and in which other provisions were deemed more important, see Upadhye & Lang,
supra note 8, at 99 (calling the “drug-user fee reauthorization . . . the most
important provision”).  Even more significant, the Supreme Court has made clear
that “[i]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption
of a controlling rule of law.”  United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496 (1997)
(alteration in original) (quoting another source); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2053–54 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[L]egislative inaction is usually indeterminate” and “[a]llowing legislative inaction
to guide common-law decisionmaking is not deference, but abdication”); Johnson
v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on
“congressional inaction” to signal acquiescence to a prior judicial opinion is “a
canard”).
58 See supra text and notes accompanying 55–57. R
59 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4 (prepared statement of Sen. Chuck R
Grassley (R-IA)).
60 Id. (prepared statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)).
61 S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG., SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS, TAXPAY-
ERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2, 115 (2016) [hereinafter SUDDEN PRICE
SPIKES]. See also Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Use Safety Rule to Block Generics,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, at B1 (quoting Rep. Henry Waxman: “The purpose of
these postmarket safety plans was to protect consumers from risky drugs, not to
allow brand companies to thwart generic competition.”).
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In addition to the brand providing samples, Congress an-
ticipated that generics and brands would need to cooperate.
The 2007 legislation creating the regime required brands and
generics to work together to create shared REMS known as a
Single Shared REMS program (“SSRS”).62  With the exception
of instances in which the burden of such a single, shared sys-
tem outweighs the benefit63 or an aspect of the elements to
assure the drug’s safe use is covered by a patent or trade se-
cret,64 the brand and generic must work together in creating a
shared REMS program.
Finally, it is not just Congress that has lamented brands’
denials of needed samples.  The FDA has demonstrated similar
concern.  Testifying at a Senate hearing, a leading agency offi-
cial worried that REMS elements to ensure safe use “may re-
strict who gets the drug,” with this power “used as an excuse
. . . to not give the drug to the generics so they can compare it to
their drug.”65  Such behavior causes “barriers and delays in
getting generics on the market.”66
II
REMS CASELAW
Courts have addressed the issue of brand firms using
REMS to block or delay generic entry.  But this is a nascent
issue, analyzed in only seven cases to date, none past the mo-
tion-to-dismiss stage.  Part II introduces the cases, most of
which occurred in the setting of brands’ refusals to provide
samples to generics, and two of which arose in the shared
REMS setting.
A. Lannett v. Celgene
In the first case, Lannett v. Celgene, Lannett sued Celgene,
the manufacturer of thalidomide (Thalomid), which originally
was used as a sleeping pill to treat morning sickness during
pregnancy and has been used to treat patients with multiple
62 See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B).
63 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. 2016).
64 Id. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(ii).
65 Generic Drug User Fee Amendments: Accelerating Patient Access to Generic
Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 114th
Cong. at 1:03:09–22 (2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?403817-1/hearing-
generic-drug-approval-process-accessibility&start=3777 [https://perma.cc/
9AU8-38AU] (testimony of Janet Woodcock, Dir., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr.
For Drug Evaluation & Research).
66 Id. at 1:03:25–33.
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myeloma and leprosy complications.67  Because the drug was
notoriously linked to severe birth defects and fetal deaths, the
FDA in 1998 approved it with strict safety protocols called a
System for Thalidomide Education and Prescribing Safety
(“STEPS”) that restricted the drug’s distribution.68
Lannett sought FDA approval to market a generic version
of Thalomid.  It alleged that the agency approved its request to
obtain samples from Celgene but that Celgene refused to sell
samples.69  At the same time, the STEPS program prevented
Lannett from obtaining samples through other channels.  The
generic alleged that it agreed to all the “health and safety re-
strictions set forth by the FDA” to acquire Thalomid.70  And it
contended that Celgene’s refusal to provide samples prevented
it from introducing a generic version and harmed consumers
who were forced to pay monopoly prices.71
Without offering a substantive opinion, the district court
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.72  Shortly afterwards,
the case settled.73
B. Actelion v. Apotex
The second case involved bosentan (Tracleer), a drug used
to treat pulmonary arterial hypertension.74  Brand firm Acte-
lion sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty
to sell samples to Apotex, Roxane, and Actavis, justifying its
refusal based on “government-mandated safety concerns.”75
The generics, on the other hand, alleged that Actelion refused
to sell samples in order to maintain a monopoly.76
In ruling from the bench that it would deny defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the court noted that the Supreme Court’s
67 Complaint at 1, 5, Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., Civil Action No. 08-3920-
TJS (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2008); Thalidomide (marketed as Thalomid) Information,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarket-
drugsafetyinformationforpatientsandproviders/UCM107296.htm  [https://
perma.cc/H4M7-MT8L] (last updated July 24, 2015).
68 Complaint, supra note 67, at 2, 4–5. R
69 Id. at 2.
70 Id. at 18.
71 Id. at 16, 18.
72 Order upon Consideration of Defendant Celgene Corp.’s Renewed Motion
to Dismiss, Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920-TJS (Mar. 30, 2011); Bat-
taglia, supra note 49, at 28 n.14. R
73 Erin Coe, Lannett Cuts Deal with Celgene in Thalomid Antitrust Case,
LAW360 (Dec.7, 2011, 2:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/291483/
print?section=competition [https://perma.cc/8WZR-8PXP].
74 See Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 16. R
75 See id. at 116.
76 Id.
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refusal-to-deal decisions were “fact-specific” and “industry-
specific.”77  In particular, it observed that “[t]he FDA is not the
[Federal Communications Commission]” but is “a different en-
vironment,” which made “clear” that the agency “does not have
the regulatory power to compel samples” and that “there is no
other potential remedy to a defendant suffering anticompetitive
conduct in that regulatory scheme.”78  The court was “mindful
of what Justice Scalia said” in the important case of Verizon v.
Trinko79 that “it’s not the role of this Court or any Court to
impose its own sense of competition or fairness or to become a
super-regulatory agency.”80  But “[t]hat having been said,” the
court continued, “Trinko can’t repeal Section 2,” which “sur-
vives,” and is “available, if the facts allow it, to prevent the
improper maintenance and extension of a monopoly through
improperly motivated conduct.”81
Turning to the facts of the case, the generics “alleged a
profit motive which did not exist in Trinko.”82  And the court
found that the generic firms could successfully prove monopo-
lization if they could show that defendants were “motivated not
so much by safety concerns but instead [ ] by the desire to use
the REMS or REMS equivalent . . . to maintain and extend a
monopoly.”83  Shortly after the court denied the motion to dis-
miss, the case settled.84
C. Mylan v. Celgene
In the third case, Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Celgene, Mylan
sued Celgene, alleging that Celgene misused its REMS program
to prevent Mylan from obtaining samples of Thalomid and Rev-
limid, treatments for, among other conditions, cancers and
bone marrow disorders.85  In 1998, the FDA approved
Thalomid with the STEPS program described above.86  Rev-
limid also had an approved REMS program.
77 Id. at 115.
78 Id. at 115–16.
79 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
80 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 116. R
81 Id.
82 Id. at 115.
83 Id. at 117.
84 Kat Greene, Actelion Settles Row over Giving Drugs to Generics Makers,
LAW360 (Feb.28, 2014, 7:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/514434/
print?section=competition [https://perma.cc/L2K3-C8W4].
85 Transcript of Oral Opinion at 3–4, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp.,
No. 14-2094-ES (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014), ECF No. 54.
86 Id. See supra text accompanying note 68. R
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Mylan first attempted to obtain samples from Celgene in
October 2004 and continued to negotiate, unsuccessfully, for
five years.87  The Thalomid STEPS program also prevented My-
lan from obtaining samples of the drug through wholesale dis-
tributors.88  Mylan similarly alleged that it unsuccessfully
negotiated for Revlimid samples from 2009 until 2012.89  My-
lan claimed that Celgene violated antitrust law because it sold
samples at retail prices to research organizations and lacked a
legitimate business reason for refusing to sell to Mylan.90
The district court denied Celgene’s motion to dismiss, find-
ing that Mylan sufficiently pled a monopolization claim.91  It
found that Third Circuit cases that had analyzed duties to deal
found a “prior course of dealing” to be “relevant but not disposi-
tive in determining whether such a duty applies.”92  It also
noted that in Trinko, the Supreme Court considered facts like
selling at retail and a prior course of dealing “not for their
independent significance, but rather for what they suggest: [a]
willingness to engage in irrational, anticompetitive conduct.”93
The court concluded that Mylan’s pleadings were “sufficient to
allow the case to proceed to discovery,” in part because Celgene
pled “no legitimate business reason” for the behavior.94
Celgene filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Third Circuit
denied.95  The case is scheduled for trial in 2017.96
D. In re Suboxone
In the fourth case, In re Suboxone, direct purchasers and
end payors of Suboxone, a drug used to treat opioid addiction,
87 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 4–5. R
88 Id. at 4.
89 Id. at 7–9 (“Mylan alleges that Celgene followed a ‘nearly identical path of
delay’ for Revlimid, and that it worked to obtain samples from August 2009 to May
2012.”).
90 Id. at 17–18.
91 Id. at 9.
92 Id. at 12–13.
93 Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
94 Id. at 17–18.  The court dismissed a Section 1 claim targeting the brand
manufacturer and distributors, finding that there was no showing that they had a
“common anticompetitive goal.” Id. at 24.
95 Vin Gurrieri, 3rd Circ. Declines to Hear Mylan, Celgene Antitrust Fight,
LAW360 (Mar. 6, 2015, 4:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/628588/
3rd-circ-declines-to-hear-mylan-celgene-antitrust-fight [https://perma.cc/
8DKX-TA93].
96 Brian Malkin, NYSBA’s REMS and Other Drug Distribution Restrictions Pro-
gram Provided an Excellent and Informative Discussion, FDA LIFE (Nov. 4, 2016),
http://www.fdalife.com/2016/11/04/nysbas-rems-and-other-drug-distribution
-restrictions-program-provided-an-excellent-and-informative-discussion/
[https://perma.cc/4H4DVUBS].
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filed multi-district litigation against Reckitt Benckiser.97  Plain-
tiffs alleged multiple antitrust violations, including a claim that
Reckitt manipulated the requirement of an SSRS.98
In December 2011, the FDA approved Reckitt’s Suboxone
REMS program to decrease the risk of pediatric exposure.99
The next month, the FDA informed sponsors of pending generic
applications that brand and generic versions would be subject
to an SSRS, and the FDA anticipated that this requirement
would be completed by May 2012.100
Seeking to undercut the requirement of working together,
Reckitt “reportedly turned down numerous invitations to par-
ticipate in meetings with the [g]enerics, and refused to engage
in substantive discussions until the [g]enerics agreed to a num-
ber of conditions the[y] found unfavorable, [including] an up-
front agreement that all manufacturers would share the costs
of product liability for future potential lawsuits.”101  The plain-
tiffs also alleged that Reckitt “refused to share non-public in-
formation from its REMS program until its demands were
met.”102
Plaintiffs notified the FDA of Reckitt’s refusal, but the
agency acknowledged that it could not compel the firm to share
its non-public REMS program.103  Although the FDA implored
Reckitt to work with the generics in good faith and to not block
or delay them, the brand allegedly refused to cooperate unless
the generics granted it veto authority or a super-majority vote
on all issues relating to the SSRS.  With Reckitt taking “unrea-
sonable positions” and using “delay tactics to keep [g]enerics
off of the market for as long as possible,”104 the generics sought
and received a waiver from the FDA to submit their own sepa-
rate REMS program.105
The court granted Reckitt’s motion to dismiss, concluding
that its refusal to cooperate did not violate the antitrust
97 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
98 Id. at 674–77; Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505-1(i)(1)(B), 21
U.S.C. § 355-1 (i)(1)(B) (Supp. 2016) (“A drug that is the subject of an abbreviated
new drug application and the listed drug shall use a single, shared system under
subsection (f).”).
99 In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d at 675.
100 Id. Plaintiffs explained that the agency gave a short turnaround time be-
cause Reckitt’s recently approved REMS only needed to be amended slightly to
incorporate the bioequivalent generics.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 675, 687.
105 Id. at 676.
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laws.106  It stated that, even though “[i]t would have been easier
to have Reckitt provide its REMS to its competitors with no
strings attached, and participation on Reckitt’s part would
have allowed the process to move more quickly[,] . . . a monopo-
list certainly has no duty to deal under terms and conditions
that the rivals find commercially advantageous.”107
The court reasoned that the generics could apply for a
waiver and create their own program.108  The case thus differed
from the denial-of-samples cases, where the generic was not
able to receive a sample in the first place.  And the court found
that even though there could be liability “where the SSRS pro-
cess is manipulated to completely preclude a generic from filing
an [application],” that was “not the situation” in this case.109
E. Natco v. Gilead Sciences
In the fifth case, Natco Pharma v. Gilead Sciences, generic
firm Natco sued Gilead, the manufacturer of ambrisentan
(Letairis), a drug used for the treatment of pulmonary arterial
hypertension.110  Letairis can cause serious birth defects and is
subject to a REMS program limiting its distribution to specialty
pharmacies, dispensed by specially certified pharmacists.
Natco alleged that Gilead refused to sell Letairis samples,
thereby preventing its generic drug from receiving FDA ap-
proval.111  Natco also claimed that it offered to pay a market
rate for samples and to buy the samples from Express Scripts,
one of the specialty pharmacies dispensing Letairis.
The court granted Gilead’s motion to dismiss on the
grounds that Natco could have received the drug through a
REMS-certified physician.112  The court also was persuaded by
another company’s ability to obtain the drug for bioequivalence
testing.113  The court found that complying with a REMS pro-
gram was a legitimate business reason not to sell the sam-
ples.114  And it dismissed Natco’s Section 1 claim on the
106 Id. at 688.
107 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting another source).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Civil No. 14-3247 (DWF/JSM), 2015 WL 5718398, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 29,
2015).
111 Id. at *2.
112 Id. at *5.
113 Id. at *5–6.
114 Id. at *5.
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grounds that it did not specify particularized facts alleging an
anticompetitive conspiracy.115
F. In re Thalomid and Revlimid
In In re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation, the
court denied a motion to dismiss in a third case challenging
Celgene’s denial of samples of Thalomid and Revlimid.116  The
plaintiffs challenged Celgene’s refusal to provide samples,
which was “contrary to FDA communications with the generic
manufacturers, which they forwarded to Celgene, and which
stated that the agency would not take action if Celgene pro-
vided the samples.”117
Celgene argued that a termination of a prior course of deal-
ing was a necessary element of a refusal-to-deal claim.  The
court rejected this argument, explaining that the termination of
dealing in the classic case of Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing118 was “used as circumstantial evidence” of the defend-
ants’ “anti-competitive motivation” and “lack of legitimate busi-
ness justifications.”119  The court found that “motivation is
central” and that it was “too soon” to determine that issue
because Celgene “provided samples to researchers who were
not seeking to enter the market, but not to competitors who
were.”120  The court found a “plausible inference” that defen-
dant’s reliance on its distribution programs was “pretextual”
since it “continued to refuse to deal” even after the generics
provided letters from the FDA indicating that the agency would
not take action if Celgene provided samples.121  The court also
rejected a defense based on product liability concerns, stating
that “[t]he possibility that [a brand] could be liable for a generic
drug’s harm is . . . not a legitimate justification that would
support its refusal to supply generic manufacturers with sam-
ples.”122  Finally, the court denied a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of an overall anticompetitive scheme that included
obtaining patents by fraud, engaging in sham litigation, filing a
115 Id. at *7.
116 Civil No.: 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 9589217, at *21 (D.N.J. Oct. 29,
2015).
117 Id. at *5.
118 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
119 Thalomid & Revlimid, 2015 WL 9589217, at *15.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at *16.
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sham citizen petition with the FDA, and entering into “pay-for-
delay” settlements.123
G. In re Suboxone II
In a second Suboxone decision,124 generic Amneal
Pharmaceuticals sued Indivior (the successor company to
Reckitt), the manufacturer of suboxone.125  Amneal alleged
that Indivior delayed generic entry by preventing the develop-
ment of an SSRS and filing a sham citizen petition, thereby
engaging in monopolization, attempted monopolization, and
false advertising.126
As discussed above,127 in January 2012, the FDA directed
all generic filers to contact Indivior to develop an SSRS, expect-
ing that the process would be completed by May 2012.  But the
brand refused to participate in weekly meetings, demanded
that generics share product-liability costs, and refused to en-
gage in substantive conversations or describe its REMS pro-
gram at an initial meeting.
In June 2012, the FDA allowed the generic companies to
create a new REMS that did not use Indivior’s allegedly propri-
ety information, expecting the SSRS to be “up and running” by
August 2012.128  But Indivior came up with “new excuses” to
delay the SSRS, refusing to sign an agreement unless the
generics “agree[d] to share a pre-specified percentage of all fu-
ture product liability claims, regardless of fault.”129  The gener-
ics instead requested a waiver of the shared program, which
the FDA granted in February 2013.130
Amneal challenged Indivior’s conduct in relation to the
SSRS, claiming that the actions amounted to anticompetitive
deception.131  The court rejected such a claim on the grounds
that the ruling on which Amneal relied, Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc.,132 was “decidedly narrow” and “confined to its
unique factual circumstances” of promises made to standard-
setting organizations.133  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’
123 Id. at *5–7, *16.
124 See supra subpart II.D.
125 In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2445, 2017 WL 36371, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 4, 2017).
126 Id. at *1, *3.
127 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
128 Suboxone, 2017 WL 36371, at *3–4.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *5.
131 Id. at *7.
132 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).
133 Suboxone, 2017 WL 36371, at *7–8.
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claims, finding that they merely “recast[ ]” their duty-to-deal
allegation as a deception claim.134
In contrast, the court found that “a plaintiff can allege a
series of actions that when taken together make out antitrust
liability even though some of the individual actions, when
viewed independently, are not all actionable.”135  Because
“there has been no determination . . . that every aspect of the
conduct alleged by Amneal fails under the antitrust laws[,] . . .
Indivior’s conduct during the SSRS process may be considered
as one aspect of the overarching scheme claim.”136
In short, courts in four of the five cases addressing a re-
fusal to provide samples for generic testing denied motions to
dismiss, allowing the case to proceed.  In contrast, the two
cases involving a shared REMS program rejected antitrust lia-
bility for standalone claims, with one acknowledging potential
liability as part of an overall course of conduct.  Given the
fledgling state of analysis, this Article next articulates an anti-
trust framework for courts to apply.
III
ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK
The most typical antitrust case against brands for denying
samples to generics is a monopolization claim under Section 2
of the Sherman Act.137  To be liable for illegal monopolization, a
company not only must have monopoly power but also must
engage in exclusionary conduct.138  This Part examines these
issues.  It first addresses monopoly power before analyzing re-
fusals to deal with rivals.  It then focuses on the existence and
effectiveness of a regulatory regime.  And it concludes with a
discussion of the “no economic sense” test that can be dis-
cerned in refusal-to-deal cases and more general monopoliza-
tion jurisprudence and antitrust scholarship.
A Section 1 claim targeting agreements between brands
and other firms has received less attention.139  It is unlikely
that a brand and generic would enter into an arrangement
violating Section 1 because a denial of a sample does not result
in the requisite agreement,140 and the shared REMS setting
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at *9.
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
138 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
139 The absence of mergers and acquisitions precludes reliance on Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
140 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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(where the parties’ continuing interactions lead to a greater
opportunity for coordination) is marked by divergent incen-
tives, with generics seeking to enter the market quickly and
brands seeking to delay entry.141  But it is conceivable that a
brand could enter into an agreement with distributors to with-
hold samples.  And in this scenario, it is no defense that, as one
court asserted, there is no “common anticompetitive goal”142
since a plaintiff challenging an agreement under Section 1 only
needs to show anticompetitive effects that outweigh procompe-
titive justifications under the Rule of Reason.143
A. Monopoly Power
A monopolization case consists of monopoly power and ex-
clusionary conduct.144  The first element, which has not been
the focus of the REMS cases to date, is monopoly power, which
has been defined as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.”145  Monopoly power can be shown in one of two
ways.  First, it can be proved indirectly by examining a defen-
dant’s market share along with barriers to entry that could
entrench that market position.146  Courts regularly hold that a
90 percent market share supports market power, with some
courts finding a 75 percent share to be sufficient.147
141 In contrast, aligned incentives are present in other pharmaceutical behav-
ior, most notably “pay for delay” (sometimes called “reverse payment” or “exclu-
sion payment”) settlements in which brands pay generics (initially in cash, now in
in-kind transactions) to delay entry. E.g., FTC v. Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223,
2227 (2013).  This raises antitrust concern because the brand gets more exclu-
sion than is warranted by the patent alone. See Michael A. Carrier, Payment After
Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2014).  “Because the brand makes more by
keeping the generic out of the market than the two parties would receive by
competing in the market, the parties have an incentive to split the monopoly
profits, making each better off than if the generic had entered.”  Michael A. Car-
rier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality,
108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 73 (2009).  In many cases, the generic even “gains more
through settlement than through successful litigation.” Id.
142 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 24. R
143 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for
the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827 (2009) (surveying Rule-of-Reason
cases between 1999 and 2009); Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason:
Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265 (1999) (surveying Rule-of-Reason
cases between 1977 and 1999).
144 E.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
145 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
146 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE, § 6.2b, at 359–60 (5th ed. 2016).
147 Id. § 6.2a, at 357.
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Second, monopoly power can be proved directly,148 such as
when a brand firm is able to “maintain the price of [a] drug . . .
at supracompetitive levels without losing substantial
sales . . . .”149  Direct proof of monopoly power also can consist
of observable effects on the market such as a price increase or
output reduction.150
The Supreme Court has held that a market can consist of a
single product151 and courts have held that a single brand drug
can constitute its own relevant market, which has led naturally
to the conclusion of monopoly power.152  As discussed below,
where potential purchasers have no alternative to using a par-
ticular drug, as is typically the case in the REMS setting, mo-
nopoly power is likely.153
B. Refusals to Deal
The caselaw on exclusionary conduct is less clear than that
on monopoly power.  Courts often distinguish between the
“willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power” and
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
148 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 69–70 (7th ed.
2012) (noting that “direct proof has provided the basis for findings of substantial
anticompetitive effects in some prominent cases”).
149 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388
n.19 (D. Mass. 2013); see also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224,
246 (D. Conn. 2015).
150 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007).
151 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481–82
(1992).
152 E.g., Aggrenox, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (stating that if the brand was not
“able to charge supracompetitive prices,” it “is not clear why [it] would have sued
to prevent entry” of the generic); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 869 (Cal.
2015) (stating that plaintiff’s prima facie case “will suffice, without more, to raise a
presumption of the patentee’s market power” since “[l]ogically, a patentee would
not pay others to stay out of the market unless it had sufficient market power to
recoup its payments through supracompetitive pricing”); Nexium, 968 F. Supp. 2d
at 388 (rejecting defendants’ claim that “other drugs may be used to treat heart-
burn”); In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1319
n.40 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (relevant market composed of brand and generic terazosin
hydrochloride); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 680–81
(E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that brand and
generic versions of heart medication with chemical compound diltiazem hydro-
chloride constitute single market); but see, e.g., Meijer, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott
Holdings Co., 245 F.R.D. 26, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2007) (ordering discovery on oral
contraceptives beyond brand and related generic version); In re Remeron Direct
Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 367 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (D.N.J. 2005) (rejecting
market definition limited to brand and generic versions because “[g]enerics nor-
mally enter the market with prices significantly lower than that of the first brand
name manufacturers”).
153 See infra notes 216–21 and accompanying text. R
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uct, business acumen, or historic accident.”154  This Article
focuses on a monopolization claim based on a refusal to deal
with potential rivals.155
Courts have explained that monopolists generally do not
have a duty to deal with competitors.156  A century ago, the
Supreme Court famously declared that “as a general matter,
the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict the long recognized right of
[a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal.’”157  But the Court later ex-
plained that this right is not “unqualified”158 and that “[u]nder
certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can
constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate [Section] 2.”159
In the context of sample denials, this Article uncovers a combi-
nation of regulatory ineffectiveness and conduct lacking eco-
nomic sense that triggers such an obligation.  The facts of the
leading refusal-to-deal cases offer guidance.
Several monopolization cases have served as landmarks
guiding refusal-to-deal analysis.160  For example, in Aspen Ski-
ing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the owner of three
downhill skiing facilities in Aspen, Colorado failed to offer a
justification for withdrawing from a joint ticketing arrangement
with the owner of the only other facility in the area.161  The
Supreme Court defined exclusionary conduct as that which
“tends to impair the opportunities of rivals” and which “either
154 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
155 Another somewhat-related antitrust claim treats the sample as an “essen-
tial facility” that a monopolist cannot deny to rivals seeking to compete in a
market.  A plaintiff relying on such a theory must show “(1) control of the essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability . . . to duplicate the essential
facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility[;] . . . and (4) the feasibility of
providing the facility.”  MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33
(7th Cir. 1983).  This Article does not focus on essential-facilities claims, which
are more narrowly targeted to natural monopolies and conduct in downstream
markets and less likely to be consistent with the conservatism of the no-eco-
nomic-sense test and the factual setting of brands’ denial of samples.
156 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600
(1985).
157 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)).
158 Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 601.
159 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
160 See generally Michael A. Carrier, Nicole L. Levidow & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Using Antitrust Law to Challenge Turing’s Daraprim Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1379 (2017), (analyzing whether, by altering distribution scheme, Tur-
ing violated antitrust laws).
161 See 472 U.S. 585, 605–11 (1985).
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does not further competition on the merits or does so in an
unnecessarily restrictive way.”162  The Court found that the
monopolist was liable for anticompetitive conduct because it
was willing to forego ticket sales and sacrifice profits to harm
its smaller competitor.163
In a second classic case, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, the Supreme Court required a company to share elec-
tric power transmission with rivals.164  The company “was al-
ready in the business of providing a service to certain
customers,” and thus could not “refuse[ ] to provide the same
service to certain other customers.”165  In particular, there
were “no engineering factors that prevented Otter Tail from
selling power at wholesale to those towns that wanted munici-
pal plants or [transferring] the power.”166  Rather, its “refusals
to sell at wholesale or to [transfer] were solely to prevent munic-
ipal power systems from eroding its monopolistic position.”167
And as discussed in the next Section, additional monopoliza-
tion cases highlight the importance of an effective regulatory
regime covering the conduct.
C. Regulatory Regime
One of the most important developments in antitrust law in
the past generation has been the Supreme Court’s attention to
regulatory regimes.  In recent years, the Court has pointed to
these regimes in the telecommunications and securities con-
texts in downplaying the need for antitrust enforcement.168
The Supreme Court in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP169 considered the effect of a
telecommunications regime on the application of antitrust law.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to break up local
monopolies by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers
(“ILECs”), which had state-provided monopolies in the provi-
sion of local phone service, to share their networks with com-
petitors.  The Trinko case arose when an AT&T customer
162 Id. at 605 n.32.
163 Id. at 608.
164 See generally 410 U.S. 366, 377–82 (1973) (affirming lower court’s monop-
olization finding).
165 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 410 (2004).
166 Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 378.
167 Id.
168 This section is adapted from Carrier, Unsettling Settlements, supra note
141. R
169 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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alleged that Verizon discriminated against new entrants in the
local market.170
The Court found that the statute “deter[red] and remed[ied]
anticompetitive harm” and thus rejected the plaintiff’s refusal-
to-deal claim.171  The presence of a regime that included penal-
ties and reporting requirements172 significantly reduced “the
additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforce-
ment.”173  In contrast, the Court continued, where “nothing
built into the regulatory scheme . . . performs the antitrust
function, the benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes con-
siderable disadvantages.”174
The Court distinguished the Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail
cases by noting that the defendants in those cases offered ski
lift tickets and power transmission, respectively, which were
services already available to the public.175  By contrast, Verizon
was required to share unbundled network elements, a “brand
new” type of service that “exist[ed] only deep within the bowels”
of the company.176  These network elements were “offered not
to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable expense and
effort,” which played a role in the dismissal of Trinko’s claim.177
The Court also worried about requiring a firm to share with its
rivals, as such a remedy would “require[ ] antitrust courts to
act as central planners” and could “facilitate the supreme evil
of antitrust: collusion.”178
In addition to considering the role of the telecommunica-
tions regime in fostering competition, the Court more generally
described the relationship between antitrust and regulation.  It
explained that “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to
the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at
issue.”179  In particular, courts must take “careful account” of
“the pervasive federal and state regulation characteristic of the
industry.”180  And the analysis needs to “recognize and reflect
170 For a detailed overview and analysis of Trinko, see generally Michael A.
Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP. L. 357
(2006).
171 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
172 Id. at 413.
173 Id. at 412.
174 Id. (citation omitted).
175 Id. at 409–10.
176 Id. at 410.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 408.
179 Id. at 411.
180 Id. (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91
(1975)).
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the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated in-
dustry to which it applies.”181
Consistent with this approach, the Court in Credit Suisse
Securities v. Billing182 concluded that the securities law regime
“implicitly preclud[ed]” the application of the antitrust laws.  In
Billing, securities buyers challenged practices by which under-
writing firms forced them to buy additional shares, pay high
commissions, and purchase less desirable securities.  The
Court explained that the conduct fell “squarely within the
heartland of securities regulations”183 and that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) had authority to supervise
the activities and “continuously exercised” such authority.184
It also pointed to the “complex, detailed line” separating per-
mitted from forbidden activity and the existence of activity that
could be punished under the antitrust laws but upheld under
the securities laws.185
Before minimizing the need for antitrust scrutiny, courts
must find not only that a regulatory regime exists but also that
it functions effectively.  In Trinko, Justice Scalia explained that
phone companies that provided local service were required to
“be on good behavior” and not to discriminate in providing
access to certain facilities before they could enter the long-
distance market.186  In addition, firms that did not satisfy these
conditions were subject to financial penalties, daily or weekly
reporting requirements, and the suspension or revocation of
long-distance approval.187  The Court concluded that “the re-
gime was an effective steward of the antitrust function.”188  In
Credit Suisse, the Court noted the SEC’s active enforcement,
pointing as one example to its detailed definitions of “what
underwriters may and may not do and say during their road
shows” and bringing actions against underwriters who violated
the regulations.189  In short, it is not just the existence of a
181 Id. at 411–12 (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
182 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007).
183 Id. at 285.
184 Id. at 277.
185 Id. at 279.
186 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
187 See id. at 412–13.  Even if the effectiveness of the telecommunications
regime was weaker than the Court anticipated, at least the regulators were engag-
ing in actions that promoted competition. See Carrier, Unsettling Settlements,
supra note 141, at 69–70. R
188 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413.
189 Billing, 551 U.S. at 277.
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regulatory regime that is important for antitrust analysis but
also its effectiveness.
D. No-Economic-Sense Test
In contemplating tests for exclusionary conduct, one con-
servative approach that has been employed in other contexts is
the “no economic sense test.”190  This framework determines if
the exclusion of rivals “likely would have been profitable if the
nascent competition flourished and the monopoly was not
maintained.”191  Applying the test requires an evaluation of the
conduct’s gains (not including those from eliminating competi-
tion) and costs to the monopolist.192  The test focuses on the
“reasonably anticipated impact” (according to “objective eco-
nomic considerations for a reasonable person”) rather than its
actual impact.193
The no-economic-sense inquiry offers an economic test to
determine whether the monopolist’s sole motive is to impair
competition.  If a firm undertakes conduct that makes no eco-
nomic sense, its “anticompetitive intent” can be “unambigu-
ously . . . inferred.”194  As one commentator has explained, the
test’s application “could not be simpler if . . . the conduct
cannot possibly confer an economic benefit on the defendant
other than by eliminating competition.”195  Even in more
nuanced settings than sample denials or shared REMS set-
tings, the “technological superiority” of a new product should
not prevent a finding of exclusionary conduct since the “value
to consumers of the new system relative to the preexisting sys-
tem” may not be “greater than the required development
190 This section is adapted from Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen,
Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2016).
191 Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The
“No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 415 (2006).  For conduct alleg-
edly creating a monopoly, the test asks “whether the conduct likely would have
been profitable if the existing competitors were not excluded and monopoly was
not created.” Id.
192 Id. at 416.
193 Id.
194 A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusion-
ary Conduct—Are There Unifying Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 393 (2006).
See also id. at 391–92 (employing the term “sacrifice test” because it is “widely
used,” but recognizing that both this test and the no-economic-sense test depend
“not on the timeline, but rather on the nature of the conduct—on whether it would
make no business or economic sense but for its likelihood of harming competi-
tion”); Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 76 (2009) (explaining that conduct that is
economically irrational absent reduced competition leads to the natural inference
that the actor “was aware of and motivated solely to achieve that reduction”).
195 Werden, supra note 191, at 415. R
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costs.”196  In short, if a brand acquires or maintains monopoly
power by engaging in sample denials or shared REMS behavior
that fails the no-economic-sense test, courts should find it lia-
ble for illegal monopolization since the behavior makes no
sense other than by stifling generic competition.197
Outside the REMS setting, many courts, most notably the
Supreme Court, have endorsed and applied a framework based
on this analysis.198  In Aspen Skiing, the Court found that the
defendant “was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and con-
sumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on
its smaller rival.”199  And in Trinko, the Court highlighted “a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticom-
petitive end.”200  Lower courts have offered similar
approaches.201
196 Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:
Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 49 (1981). See also Spirit Airlines
v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005) (Moore, J., concurring) (stating
that viable predation claims are based on theory that “an incumbent seeks to
retain monopolist control in the future by ceasing to engage in economically
rational behavior in the present in an effort to drive potential rivals from the
market”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144
(1978) (suggesting test to identify business practices that “would not be consid-
ered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be
driven from the market, leaving the predator with a market share sufficient to
command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon
competitive behavior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening”).
197 Application of the no-economic-sense test would reach an outcome similar
to (or even more deferential than) tests courts have used to analyze refusals to
deal outside the sample-denial context.  Two of the three approaches have applied
a “presumptively valid business justification” that can be rebutted, sometimes on
grounds of pretext.  Data Gen. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th
Cir. 1997).  If conduct satisfies this presumptively valid justification, it will clear
the easier-to-satisfy threshold that accepts all justifications other than those
based on harming competitors.  The third approach, articulated in In re Indepen-
dent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2000), provides three categories in which patent holders could be liable: tying,
obtaining a patent through fraud, and sham litigation.  The first of these catego-
ries could reach more aggressively than the no-economic-sense test to ensnare a
patentholder even if it had a justification for tying.  And the categories addressing
fraud and sham litigation present behavior that would also tend not to satisfy the
no-economic-sense test.  In short, the no-economic-sense test would be no more
restrictive—and often would be less restrictive—than the general approaches
courts have applied to refusals to deal.
198 Many of the courts’ versions apply the related profit-sacrifice test, which
offers a more aggressive test that may not credit short-term profit sacrifice even
for long-term economic gain. See infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. R
199 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11
(1985).
200 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
201 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir.
2013) (test satisfied when “monopolist’s conduct [is] irrational but for its anticom-
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Commentators have advocated the “no economic sense”
test.202  So have the leading antitrust treatises.203  And the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has advanced it in several im-
portant cases.  For example, in Trinko, the agency asserted that
“conduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make
no economic sense for the defendant but for its tendency to
petitive effects” (citing Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597; Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407));
Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (con-
sidering predatory practice to be “one in which a firm sacrifices short-term profits
in order to drive out of the market or otherwise discipline a competitor” (citing
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–23
(1993))); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139,
148 (4th Cir. 1990) (conduct exclusionary if monopolist made “a short-term sacri-
fice in order to further its exclusive, anti-competitive objectives” (citing Smithkline
Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978))); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T,
651 F.2d 76, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1981) (properly instructed jury could reasonably find
that monopolist designed product to impede competition); Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th Cir. 1976) (technological
tying cases “limited to those instances where the technological factor tying the
hardware to the software has been designed for the purpose of tying the products,
rather than to achieve some technologically beneficial result”); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (no liability where
“there was no evidence that IBM was sacrificing present profits with the expecta-
tion of recouping its losses with subsequent price increases”).
202 See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years
of Access Denials, 27 ANTITRUST, Fall 2012, at 50, 54 (noting that, as applied to
rival’s access demands, rule “runs the least risk of reducing investment incentives
while maintaining society’s critical interest in preserving consumer welfare
through competition”); Melamed, supra note 194, at 389 (offering test providing R
that “conduct is anticompetitive if, but only if, it makes no business sense or is
unprofitable for the defendant but for the exclusion of rivals and resulting
supracompetitive recoupment”); Werden, supra note 191, at 422–25 (articulating R
“no economic sense” framework); cf. Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distri-
bution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential
Generic Competitors, 67 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1023 (2015) (“[U]nder the profit-sacrifice
test, conduct is anticompetitive only if the defendant has no legitimate business
purpose for the conduct or it is unprofitable in the short run and makes business
sense only if a rival is excluded, leaving the defendant with a supracompetitive
recoupment in the long run.”); see generally Shadowen et al., supra note 194, at R
75–77.
203 See generally 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 773e, at 209–13 (2d ed. 2002) (refusal to deal unlawful if irrational in sense that
defendant sacrificed opportunity to make profitable sale only because of adverse
impact refusal would have on rival); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A.
LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 12.3, at 12-35 (3d
ed. 2017) (“If a design change makes no economic sense unless the exclusion of
rivals is taken into account, it is reasonable to infer both that the purpose behind
the design change was anticompetitive and, more importantly, that the anticom-
petitive effects of the design change predominated over any technological
benefits.”).
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eliminate or lessen competition.”204  In United States v.
Microsoft Corp.,205 the DOJ contended that Microsoft’s protec-
tion of its operating system monopoly was exclusionary be-
cause it “would not make economic sense unless it eliminated
or softened competition.”206  In American Airlines,207 the
agency asserted that the defendant excluded rivals by adding
“money-losing capacity” and that “distinguishing legitimate
competition from unlawful predation requires a common-sense
business inquiry” based on “whether the conduct would be
profitable, apart from any exclusionary effects.”208  And in
United States v. Dentsply Int’l,209 the DOJ argued that
“Dentsply’s exclusionary policies made no economic sense but
for their tendency to harm rivals, and so were predatory.”210
The test also avoids some of the recognized shortcomings of
the “profit sacrifice” test, a similar framework that assesses
whether conduct would be “unprofitable for the defendant but
for the exclusion of rivals and resulting supra-competitive re-
coupment.”211  In particular, the profit-sacrifice test, unlike the
no-economic-sense test, could punish short-term sacrifices
such as investments in R&D or capital equipment even though
they would lead to a higher profit in the long term.212  The no-
economic-sense test does not punish such investments, which
“make economic sense apart from any tendency to eliminate
competition.”213  And the test avoids disputes about whether
the manufacturer anticipated that it would recoup its sacri-
204 Brief for the United States and the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682) (emphasis omitted).
205 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
206 Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 48, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213).
207 United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
208 Brief for Appellant United States of America at 2, 30, United States v. AMR
Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3202) (public redacted version).
209 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
210 Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399
F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 03-4097) (public redacted version).
211 Melamed, supra note 194, at 389; see also Ordover & Willig, supra note R
196, at 9–10 (“[P]redatory behavior is a response to a rival that sacrifices part of R
the profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to
remain viable, in order to induce exit and gain consequent additional monopoly
profit.” (footnotes omitted)).
212 See Werden, supra note 191, at 424; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The R
Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTI-
TRUST 115 (2008) (noting that profit-sacrifice test “does not adequately distinguish
anticompetitive ‘sacrifice’ from procompetitive ‘investment’”).
213 Werden, supra note 191, at 424. R
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ficed profits sometime in the future.214  Having introduced the
no-economic-sense test, the next Part articulates an antitrust
framework that applies the test to sample denials and shared
REMS conduct in the pharmaceutical industry.
IV
THE ANTITRUST CASE AGAINST REMS PROGRAMS
In applying the antitrust framework articulated in Part III
to REMS programs, this Part first addresses monopoly power.
It then highlights the regulatory regime’s existence and effec-
tiveness.  Finally, it turns to exclusionary conduct, focusing
first on sample denials before concluding with shared REMS
programs.215
A. Monopoly Power
In the REMS cases to date, the courts have focused their
attention on the issue of exclusionary conduct.  For example,
after articulating the elements of the monopolization offense,
the court in In re Suboxone quickly stated that “[s]imple posses-
sion of monopoly power is not enough” and that “a defendant
must also engage in exclusionary conduct to run afoul of [Sec-
tion 2],” after which it proceeded directly to examine the issue
of the defendant’s duty to deal.216  In Mylan v. Celgene, the
court indicated (at the motion-to-dismiss stage) that the parties
disputed only the conduct element.217  And in Actelion v.
Apotex, the court ruled that it would proceed to discovery with-
out examining the issue of monopoly power.218
In the cases litigated to date, proving monopoly power has
not been a hurdle.  One reason is the procedural setting, with
courts crediting plaintiffs’ allegations related to the factually-
214 See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 1695, 1699 (2013) (describing “unnecessary and counterproductive” re-
coupment analysis); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers,
and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 319–20 (2006)
(noting that no-economic-sense test “is primarily different from the conventional
profit-sacrifice standard because it does not require a showing that there is a
period of time in which the defendant’s profits are lower than they were before the
exclusionary conduct was undertaken” and explaining that “[t]he reduction in
profits can be conceptual rather than temporal”).
215 Another anticompetitive concern, which lies outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, arises from brands’ blocking of generics through patents on REMS. See
Michael A. Carrier & Brenna Sooy, Five Solutions to the REMS Patent Problem, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1661 (2017).
216 In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 678–79 (E.D. Pa.
2014).
217 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 9. R
218 See Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 117. R
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intensive determination of monopoly power in the context of a
motion to dismiss.  But as the cases proceed to later stages,
analysis could very well reveal monopoly power, reflecting the
control that brands typically have over markets that include
REMS drugs.  For example, the factors that the FDA evalu-
ates219 in requiring REMS “imply a cost-benefit analysis”220
that considers whether other drugs treat the same disease.
Where there is a less dangerous alternative on the market, the
FDA would not be likely to approve a new, more dangerous
product.   Instead, the agency is more likely to approve a risky
REMS product only where there is no safer, effective alternative
on the market.  In other words, the REMS product is likely to
fill an unmet medical need, lack close substitutes, and reflect
monopoly power.  Regardless of the factual setting relevant to
monopoly power, the vast majority of the antitrust analysis to
date has emphasized the second element: exclusionary
conduct.221
B. Existing Regulations
Central to the antitrust analysis of exclusionary conduct is
an understanding of the regulatory regime.  As the Trinko Court
explained, “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at is-
sue.”222  Courts must take “careful account” of “the pervasive
federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry,”223
and the analysis must “recognize and reflect the distinctive
economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it
applies.”224
219 BRIEF OVERVIEW, supra note 17, at 6 (factors include the population size R
likely to use the drug, seriousness of the disease, drug’s expected benefit, ex-
pected duration of treatment, seriousness of adverse effects, and drug’s novelty).
220 Megaw, supra note 57, at 132. R
221 Another issue is whether the plaintiff can demonstrate antitrust injury.
See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2000)
(noting that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more formidable demonstration of anti-
trust injury” than higher drug prices); Anna Fabish, REMS Abuse And Antitrust
Injury: Round Peg, Square Hole, LAW360 (Nov. 4, 2015 12:55 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/723053/rems-abuse-and-antitrust-injury-round-peg-
square-hole [https://perma.cc/JTK4-UX6U]  (raising concerns with antitrust-in-
jury showing); Darren S. Tucker, Gregory F. Wells & Margaret E. Sheer, REMS:
The Next Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?, 28 ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 74,
78 (discussing elements of injury and causation).
222 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411 (2004).
223 Id. (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91
(1975)).
224 Id.
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Just as the telecommunications regime in Trinko and se-
curities regime in Billing presented comprehensive frameworks,
the Hatch-Waxman Act and FDAAA offer exhaustive schemes
that prescribed Congress’s desired balance between competi-
tion and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  The draft-
ers of the Hatch-Waxman Act used patent-term extensions,
market exclusivity, and thirty-month stays to foster innova-
tion.225  And they introduced several mechanisms to increase
generic competition.
Even though generic drugs have the same active ingredi-
ents, dosage, administration, performance, and safety as pat-
ented brand drugs, generic manufacturers were required, at
the time of the Act, to engage in lengthy and expensive trials to
demonstrate safety and effectiveness.226  The FDA approval
process took several years, and because the required tests con-
stituted infringement, generics could not begin the process
during the patent term.227  They therefore waited until the end
of the term to commence these activities, which prevented
them from entering the market until two or three years after the
patent’s expiration.  At the time Congress enacted Hatch-Wax-
man, there were no generic equivalents for roughly 150 drugs
whose patent terms had lapsed.228
The drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act229 encouraged chal-
lenges to invalid or noninfringed patents, believing that such
challenges would lead to earlier market entry and lower
prices.230  They exempted from infringement the manufacture,
use, or sale of a patented invention for uses “reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs.”231  In addition to allowing the testing of the product
before patent expiration, the drafters allowed generics to avoid
the filing of a New Drug Application (“NDA”) by submitting an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).232  To do this, the
225 See Carrier, Unsettling Settlements, supra note 141, at 43–45. R
226 Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/UCM
100100.htm [https://perma.cc/HSU7-UQTX] (last updated Aug. 24, 2017).
227 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 37, at 38. R
228 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2650.  This paragraph is adapted from Carrier, Unsettling Settlements,
supra note 141, at 42. R
229 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 335 (2012)).
230 See 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
231 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
232 See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 41, at 5. R
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generic must show that its drug possesses the same active
ingredient, route of administration, bioequivalence, and other
characteristics of the brand’s drug.  If it can make this show-
ing, it can rely on the brand’s safety and effectiveness studies,
dispensing with the need for independent preclinical or clinical
studies.233
In fact, fostering generic competition was an explicit goal of
the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Looking at the marketplace in 1984,
the drafters sought to ensure the provision of “low-cost, generic
drugs for millions of Americans.”234  And they believed the leg-
islation would “do more to contain the cost of elderly care than
perhaps anything else this Congress has passed.”235  A crucial
centerpiece of the Act, in short, involved a reduction in drug
prices by facilitating generic entry.
The importance of generic competition is crucial not only
for the Hatch-Waxman Act but also for other elements of the
pharmaceutical regime.  The drafters of the FDAAA included a
provision that made clear that ETASU measures should not be
used to prevent generic firms from accessing samples of drugs
covered by REMS.236  In particular, it made clear that “[n]o
holder of an approved covered application shall use any ele-
ment to assure safe use required by the Secretary under this
subsection to block or delay approval of an application.”237
Congress also provided that brand firms could not use REMS
programs to burden patients who had serious medical condi-
tions or difficulty accessing health care.238  Such direction has
been undermined by conduct relating to the drugs at issue in
the cases, which involved treatments for pulmonary arterial
hypertension (Tracleer), cancers and bone marrow disorders
(Thalomid and Revlimid), and opioid addiction (Suboxone).239
Nor is the goal of fostering generic competition restricted to
federal regulations.  State drug product selection (“DPS”) laws,
233 See id.; see, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S.
399, 404–05 (2012) (Hatch-Waxman Act “allow[s] a generic competitor to file an
[ANDA] piggy-backing on the brand’s NDA”).
234 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (statement of Rep. Waxman).
235 Id.
236 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (Supp. 2016) (“No holder of an approved
covered application shall use any element to assure safe use required by the
Secretary under this subsection to block or delay approval of an application under
section 355(b)(2) or (j) [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) or (j)] or to prevent application of such
element under subsection (i)(1)(B) to a drug that is the subject of an abbreviated
new drug application.”).
237 Id.
238 Id. § 355-1(f)(2)(C). See supra note 26 and accompanying text. R
239 See supra Part II.
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in effect in all fifty states today, are designed to lower prices for
consumers.240  These laws “allow—and in many cases re-
quire—pharmacists, absent a doctor’s contrary instructions, to
substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions.”241
DPS laws “are designed to address the disconnect in the
industry between prescribing doctors, who are not directly re-
sponsive to drug pricing, and paying insurers and consumers,
who do not directly select the prescribed drug.”242  In particu-
lar, DPS laws “carve out a role for pharmacists, who are much
more sensitive to prices than doctors.”243  The laws typically
allow pharmacists to substitute generic versions of brand
drugs only if they are “AB-rated” by the FDA.  To receive an AB
rating, a generic drug must be therapeutically equivalent to the
brand drug, which means that the generic has the same active
ingredient, form, dosage, strength, and safety and efficacy pro-
file.244  The drug also must be bioequivalent, which signifies
that the rate and extent of absorption in the body is roughly
equivalent to the brand drug.  Without access to samples, the
generic is not able to show equivalence, thus blocking the cru-
cial substitution at pharmacy counters throughout the
country.
C. Ineffective Regulations
The regulatory context discussed in the previous section
showed the vital significance of samples.  The Hatch-Waxman
Act and 50 state substitution laws are explicitly centered on
early generic entry to the market.
Price falls dramatically from entry because generics do not
need to replicate brand firms’ expensive and lengthy clinical
trials.245  But the prerequisite to entering the market at a low
price by demonstrating bioequivalence is the ability to access a
brand’s sample.246  This entire regime comes crashing to a halt
without this access.  For without the sample, the generic can-
not engage in the required testing and must replicate all of this
240 Carrier, supra note 33, at 1017. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying R
text.
241 Id.
242 Id.; see BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., supra note 34, at 2–3. R
243 Carrier, supra note 33, at 1017; MASSON & STEINER, supra note 35, at 7. R
244 See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (36th
ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm0790
68.htm [https://perma.cc/VQ8Y-75dd].
245 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  The lack of promotion and R
marketing is another factor lowering generic costs.
246 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. R
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work, in direct contravention of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  One
commentator has explained that “[i]f the brand company could
limit access to its drug and be immune from any liability for
doing so, the deprivation would essentially gut the purpose of
the Hatch-Waxman Act,” which Congress would not have done
in such a “back-handed manner.”247
Congress was keenly aware of the importance of generic
competition when it passed the FDAAA, which made clear that
brands could not use ETASU restrictions to “block or delay”
generic applications.248  Despite the statute’s prohibition on
blocking or delaying generic competition, more than 100 ge-
neric firms have complained that they have not been able to
access samples they need for testing to reach the market.249  As
discussed above,250 Senators have lamented that the refusal to
share samples is a “simple delay tactic [that] uses regulatory
safeguards as a weapon to block competition” and that brands
have “misus[ed]” REMS “in violation of FDA regulations and the
Hatch-Waxman Act.”251  Even though the drafters of REMS
believed that the programs would not be used to block or delay
generic entry, they have in fact been used in such a manner.252
Not only is the regime not working as intended, but the
FDA is unable to fix the problem.  A Senate committee con-
cluded that the agency “has attempted to stymie [brands’] ob-
struction” by providing letters to generic entrants indicating
that “they . . . see no safety risk,” but its “actions have been
largely ineffective.”253  While the statute “provide[s] the basis
for the FDA to take action” against brand firms, “the lack of a
remedial scheme leaves much to debate about the FDA’s au-
247 Upadhye & Lang, supra note 8, at 97. R
248 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (Supp. 2016).
249 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4 (prepared statement of Sen. Patrick R
Leahy (D-VT)).
250 Id.; see supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. R
251 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4 (prepared statement of Sen. Patrick R
Leahy (D-VT)); id. (prepared statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA)).
252 Congress has recently considered legislation that would address the con-
cerns presented by REMS programs.  The Creating and Restoring Equal Access to
Equivalent Samples Act (“CREATES Act”) of 2016 provides a cause of action if a
brand firm “decline[s] to provide sufficient quantities” of a drug “on commercially
reasonable, market-based terms.”  S. 3056, 114th Cong. § 3(b)(1)(A) (introduced
June 21, 2016).  It also provides a cause of action if the brand “fail[s] to reach
agreement with respect to a single, shared system” after 120 days. Id. § 3(b)(2).  In
addition to ordering (either) sufficient quantities of the drug or negotiation, the
legislation provides for remedies that include attorneys’ fees, costs, and an
amount sufficient for deterrence. Id. §§ 3(b)(1)(D), 3(b)(2)(C).
253 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 115. R
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thority to enforce and consequently little incentive for the FDA
to do so.”254
Nor has the agency had more success in relation to shared
REMS, as “get[ting] competitors to work together so that [they]
can get a market share from the [brand] has proven very chal-
lenging for the FDA to get . . . done,” which “has delayed ac-
cess.”255  Other than cases involving intellectual property, the
agency has concluded that it “only has the power to authorize
separate REMS systems if the delay in generic entry” has re-
sulted in a drug’s cost “affect[ing] patient access,” which means
that it “only act[s] after substantial delay.”256  The director of
the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (which is
responsible for drug safety257) has concluded that the agency
“ha[s] to try and try and try and try, and then finally . . . declare
defeat and . . . go ahead and let the generics have their own
system that is separate but equal.”258
It thus is not a surprise that the FDA has conceded that
“issues related to ensuring that marketplace actions are fair
and do not block competition would be best addressed by the
FTC, which is the Federal entity most expert in investigating
and addressing anticompetitive business practices.”259  To
similar effect, the FDA responded to a citizen petition by Pro-
metheus Laboratories by explaining that “[t]o the extent that
. . . there may be antitrust issues associated with establishing
single, shared systems,” the party should “consult with the
FTC.”260  And the court in Actelion v. Apotex found it “clear . . .
that the FDA does not have the regulatory power to compel
samples and that there is no other potential remedy to a defen-
dant suffering anticompetitive conduct in that regulatory
scheme.”261
254 Id. at 117 n.733.  The FDA does not even “have the authority to take
enforcement actions against sponsors that do not include all information re-
quested in FDA assessment plans.” HHS REPORT, supra note 30, at 22. R
255 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 115. R
256 Id. at 116.
257 About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProducts
andTobacco/CDER/ [https://perma.cc/5FN7-LJWU] (last updated Dec. 9, 2014).
258 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 116. R
259 Partial Petition Approval & Denial to Dr. Reddy’s Labs.’ Petition at 7, No.
FDA-2009-P-0266-0006 (Aug. 7, 2013).
260 Grant in Part and Denial in Part, No. FDA-2013-P-0572 at 6 (Oct. 7, 2013).
261 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 115–16. See also Anna M. R
Fabish, Why REMS Abuse Doesn’t Belong in Antitrust Litigation, LAW360 (Apr. 23,
2015, 4:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/645875/why-rems-abuse-
doesn-t-belong-in-antitrust-litigation [https://perma.cc/7LZE-MWPY] (“The FDA
would certainly need to expand its existing review and enforcement tools” to
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Because the FDA has no power to compel a sale, the regu-
latory regime is not able to address competitive effects in the
industry, ensuring an opportunity for antitrust enforce-
ment.262  As it turns out, antitrust law can play a uniquely
effective role in addressing the anticompetitive harms un-
leashed by the REMS regime.  Absent a showing, not revealed
to date, of below-market-rate offers, the denial of samples, as
shown in the next Section, makes no economic sense other
than by harming generic competition.263
D. Sample Denials
The ineffective enforcement of the pharmaceutical regula-
tory regime ensures that antitrust law has an essential role to
play.  And this regime is well-equipped to analyze behavior so
extreme that it fails even the conservative, defendant-friendly,
no-economic-sense test.
Most fundamentally, the refusal to provide REMS samples
to generics makes no economic sense other than by harming
generics.  Generics have been willing to pay a high price for
samples, with one even stating that it pays “ridiculous
amounts of money” for “a commercially immaterial quantity of
drug.”264  The caselaw provides examples of generics’ willing-
ness to purchase samples at a rate that would be profitable to
the brand.265  In Actelion v. Apotex, generic firm Apotex was
address a refusal to provide samples); Matthew Perrone, Drug Distribution Be-
comes Weapon to Block Competition, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016 5:42 PM), http://
www.detroitnews.com/story/business/2016/03/03/drug-distribution-competi
tion-prices/81286042/ [https://perma.cc/297V-TD7T] (leading FDA attorney as-
serts that the agency “is hesitant to make a call on whether a manufacturer is
actually intending to delay generic competition”).
262 The court in In re Suboxone Antitrust Litigation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D.
Pa. 2014), asserted that the statute prohibits brands from “manipulating the
process to cause delay,” which apparently “provides for increased FDA oversight
and diminishes the need for antitrust scrutiny.” Id. at 688.  But such a holding
fails to consider the effectiveness of the regulatory regime, in particular the FDA’s
inability and unwillingness to address competition concerns.
263 The Federal Trade Commission has filed two amicus briefs that have con-
tended that refusals to provide samples can constitute exclusionary conduct
under Supreme Court caselaw and undermine the goals of the Hatch-Waxman
Act; that distribution agreements are not immune from antitrust scrutiny; and
that bioequivalence testing is exempt from patent infringement. See generally
Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Brief as Amicus Curiae, Mylan Pharms. v. Celgene Corp.,
Case No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J. June 17, 2014); Fed. Trade Comm’n’s
Brief as Amicus Curiae, Actelion Pharms. v. Apotex Inc., Case No. 1:12-cv-05743-
NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2013).
264 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 2:10:38–47 (testimony of Beth R
Zelnick Kaufman).
265 Generics that lack access to a sample are not able to use a foreign sample
as a substitute. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. R
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willing to “pay market prices for the samples.”266  And in Natco
Pharma v. Gilead Sciences, generic Natco “offered to pay the
market rate and shipping” for more than 500 tablets.267
This willingness to pay the market rate has been combined
with brands’ seemingly irrational responses in refusing to pro-
vide samples.  In Mylan v. Celgene, for example, Mylan alleged
that it “requested the purchase of limited Revlimid samples for
bioequivalence testing, offering to pay market value,” and that
it was willing to “enter into an indemnification agreement” that
included nearly every concession to terms Celgene requested”
during [earlier] negotiations.268  Celgene, however, responded
by rejecting Mylan’s offer.  In fact, after negotiating for the sale
of Thalomid samples for five years, and reaching an indemnifi-
cation agreement in 2009, as of the date of this Article—eight
years later—Mylan still has not been able to obtain access to
samples.269  Another example is provided by generic firm
Amneal, which explained to a Senate committee that it re-
quested samples in December 2013, signed an agreement in
February 2016, but (as of the date of this Article) still did not
have samples.270  These examples of a lack of economic sense
are confirmed when, at the same time brands deny samples to
generics, they make sales to other entities including research
organizations, distributors, and specialty pharmacies.271
In short, it is clear that generics are willing to buy samples
from brands and, in every reported instance, pay at least a
266 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’/Counterclaim Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Plaintiffs’/Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and to Dismiss Counterclaims, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,
Case No: 1:12-cv-05743 (NLH) (AMD) (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2013), at *22; see also
Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 49 (Roxane’s counsel states that R
“[t]he generics have offered to pay retail published price or, frankly . . . any price
that was within the realm of reasonableness”).
267 Civil No. 14-3427 (DWF/JSM), 2015 WL 5718398, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 29,
2015).  The regulatory regime and legislative history make clear that, in calculat-
ing the cost of a sample, brands cannot include anticipated future effects from
product-liability lawsuits or safety concerns. See infra notes 382–96 and accom- R
panying text.
268 Plaintiff Mylan Pharms.’ Brief in Opposition to Celgene’s Motion to Dismiss
at *13–14, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., Civ. Action No. 2:14-cv-02094-
ES-MAH, 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1435 (D.N.J. June 16, 2014).
269 See Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 4–7. R
270 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 2–3 (prepared statement of Beth R
Zelnick Kaufman).
271 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 49–50; see also In re R
Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., Civil No.: 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL
9589217, at *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (“[M]otivation is central” when brand
“provided samples to researchers who were not seeking to enter the market, but
not to competitors, who were”).
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profitable market rate.  This situates the denials comfortably in
the range of settings in which courts have found liability be-
cause of a refusal to accept a retail price.
In Aspen Skiing, the Court found that the defendant “was
willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller ri-
val.”272  In discussing the decision, the Trinko Court empha-
sized “[t]he unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus
presumably profitable) course of dealing,” which “suggested a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticom-
petitive end.”273  And it observed that an “unwillingness to re-
new the ticket even if compensated at retail price revealed a
distinctly anticompetitive bent.”274
To similar effect was Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,275 in which the Court required a company to share
electric power transmission with rivals.  The firm was already
providing the service, and the only reason it refused to provide
it to competitors was “to prevent municipal power systems from
eroding its monopolistic position.”276  Similar to the ski lift tick-
ets in Aspen Skiing, the defendant was “already in the business
of providing” power transmission services to other
customers.277
In contrast, the Trinko Court distinguished between refus-
ing to sell a product at the “retail price,” an indicator of an-
ticompetitive behavior implying “a calculation” of a “future
monopoly retail price [that] would be higher,”278 and Verizon’s
ability only to obtain a “cost-based rate of compensation” under
the relevant statute.279
Refusing to make a sale at the market price (or even higher)
does not make sense absent harm to the generic.  It is consis-
tent with the monopolist’s conduct in Aspen Skiing (sacrificing
profits) and Otter Tail (harming competitors) and readily distin-
guishable from Trinko (unprofitable price).
Drug samples also are far closer to the services available to
the public under Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail than the “brand
272 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11
(1985).
273 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409 (2004) (emphasis in original).
274 Id. (emphasis in original).
275 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
276 Id. at 378.
277 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
278 Id. at 409.
279 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 41 15-NOV-17 14:39
2017] SHARING, SAMPLES, AND GENERICS 41
new” type of service in Trinko that “exist[ed] only deep within
the bowels” of Verizon.280  For REMS programs that the FDA
requires after the drug is already on the market, by definition
the product is available.  Even when a sample is requested
before a drug is approved, the brand firm is in the business of
producing drugs.  And once it has manufactured the drug, pro-
viding a sample involves no additional effort.  It is not as if the
brand needs to embark on a separate process of creating a new
product just to provide to the generics.  The ready availability of
samples offers additional evidence that the refusal to provide
them to generics constitutes behavior that makes sense only by
harming rivals.
In short, the denial of samples falls comfortably within the
factual settings of cases in which courts have found liability.
As the Actelion court recognized: “[I]f the defendants can prove
that the plaintiffs are motivated not so much by safety con-
cerns but instead . . . by the desire to use the REMS or REMS
equivalent, to use exclusive distribution agreements[,] and to
use a[n] otherwise legitimate refusal to deal together to main-
tain and extend a monopoly, then they may very well make out
a Section 2 claim.”281
E. Shared REMS
The other setting in which REMS issues have arisen in-
volves Single Shared REMS Programs, known as SSRS.282  By
offering a shared system, SSRS programs reduce the burdens
on healthcare providers and manufacturers.  For example, the
REMS program covering opioids involves multiple compa-
nies.283  Such a joint effort against a public health problem
would be much more difficult without coordination.  As a result
of the shared REMS program, more prescribers have received
training on pain management and on the safe prescription of
opioids.284
280 Id. at 410.
281 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 117. R
282 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (i)(1)(B) (Supp. 2016).
283 See Approved REMS, supra note 28. R
284 FDA Opioids Action Plan, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/UCM484714.htm [https://perma.
cc/VW5F-U5UX] (last updated Sept. 13, 2016); see also Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Extended-Release and Long-Acting Opioid
Analgesics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/in
formationbydrugclass/ucm163647.htm [https://perma.cc/T4P7-NBEV] (last up-
dated Feb. 2, 2017) (noting that REMS is “one strategy among multiple national
and state efforts to reduce the risk of abuse, misuse, addiction, overdose, and
deaths due to prescription opioid analgesics”).
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Another example is provided by the SSRS for mycopheno-
late-containing prescription medicines, which “weaken[ ] the
body’s immune system so it will not attack and reject a trans-
planted organ.”285  The FDA required the shared program be-
cause the products were marketed by different sponsors, and a
single REMS program that could be “used and shared by all of
these sponsors” would “reduce the burden on the health care
system.”286  A single, shared system for the products would
“make it easier for prescribers to participate in the REMS pro-
gram” because there would “only be one education program for
prescribers.”287  And it would be easier for manufacturers, who
could “maintain a single call center to support health care pro-
fessionals and the REMS program.”288
In short, shared REMS programs serve important public
health purposes.  And central to the programs is the alignment
of brand and generic REMS.  As an FDA official explained: “If
we are approving a generic drug and there is a REMS in place
for the innovator drug, the requirements are the same for the
[generic] product.”289
Despite this need for coordination, on several occasions
brands have delayed generic entry by failing to negotiate in
good faith, claiming that generics “remain free at all times to
285 Questions and Answers: FDA Approves a Single Shared Risk Evaluation
and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Mycophenolate-containing Medicines, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/postmarketdrugsafetyin
formationforpatientsandproviders/ucm318880.htm [https://perma.cc/4WS2-
4RR9] (last updated July 9, 2015).
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. Another example is provided by the SSRS for transmucosal immediate-
release fentanyl (“TIRF”), which relieves sudden and short-term pain in cancer
patients. See Questions and Answers: FDA Approves a Class Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy (REMS) for Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF)
Medicines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/in
formationbydrugclass/ucm284717.htm [https://perma.cc/EGB9-FTR9] (last up-
dated July 9, 2015).  The FDA approved this shared program even though the
TIRF medicines “already had individual REMS in place” to “reduce the burden on
the healthcare system of having separate REMS programs in place for individual
TIRF medicines.” Id.  The benefit of a single shared program was that
“prescribers, pharmacies, distributors, and outpatients [would] only need to en-
roll in one REMS program” in order “to prescribe, dispense, or receive all drugs in
the TIRF medicines class.” Id.
289 Terry Toigo, Assoc. Dir. for Drug Safety Operations, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin. Ctr. For Drug Evaluation & Research, A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation
& Mitigation Strategies (REMS), https://collaboration.fda.gov/p97727926/?
launcher=false&fcsContent=true&pbMode=normal [https://perma.cc/7PVG-
EJ4P].
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develop their own REMS program.”290  One technique involves
a claimed “absolute right to keep its REMS confidential,”291
which purportedly means that the FDA is unable to “compel
[the brand] to share its proprietary REMS program.”292  To the
contrary, the REMS program is not confidential, appearing
with full details including the program’s elements, sample let-
ters, patient guides, enrollment forms, and screenshots, on the
FDA’s website.293  Even if information subject to discussion
between the FDA and brand before final approval is generally
not available, the final implemented REMS program is public.
Brands also have delayed approval by employing IP.294  The
statute provides that the SSRS requirement can be waived if
“an aspect of the elements to assure safe use for the applicable
listed drug is claimed by a patent that has not expired or is a
method or process that, as a trade secret, is entitled to protec-
tion.”295  The burden is on the generic to show that “it has
sought a license for use of an aspect of the elements to assure
safe use for the applicable listed drug” and that it “was unable
to obtain a license.”296  An FDA official confirmed that brands
use “dilatory assertions that portions of the REMS are pro-
tected by . . . ‘IP’ rights or constitute trade secrets” to delay
generic access.297  In every one of its attempts to mediate a
joint SSRS program, the FDA was not successful, ultimately
allowing the generic to create its own REMS.
The FDA has allowed a generic to create its own REMS
program on thirteen occasions.298  Even though the agency has
the power to release these parties from the SSRS requirement,
it can only do so after showing that the burden of the program
outweighs the benefit or that the REMS program includes IP.299
The FDA’s power, in short, does not prevent prolonged negotia-
tions that could delay generic approval.  When a brand
290 Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 6–11, In re Suboxone
Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (MDL No. 2445).
291 Id. at 7.
292 Id. at 6.
293 Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS): Tracleer, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.
cfm?event=indvRemsDetails.page&REMS=61 [https://perma.cc/ZZL7-FS6C]
(last updated Sept. 5, 2017).
294 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 116. R
295 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2016). For the other exception,
see id. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(i) (“[T]he burden of creating a single, shared system out-
weighs the benefit of a single[ ] system.”).
296 Id. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
297 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 116. R
298 Id.
299 See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (i)(1)(B).
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manipulates the process to cause delay, the agency is not able
to remedy the issue.  As discussed above,300 the FDA “only
act[s] after substantial delay,”301 and even then, “ha[s] to try
and try and try and try, and then finally . . . declare defeat and
. . . go ahead and let the generics have their own system that is
separate but equal.”302  A leading FDA official stated simply
that brands often use shared REMS programs to “block[ ] ge-
neric competition.”303
The FDA’s inability to act carves out a potential role for
antitrust law.  How should antitrust law be applied?  The an-
swer is more nuanced than the case of sample denials.  For
negotiation is not an on/off switch that automatically triggers
(or fails to trigger) antitrust scrutiny.  But in certain cases, the
brand’s refusal to negotiate in good faith will run afoul of the
no-economic-sense test.  Factors for a court to consider include
how long the parties have been negotiating, how different the
shared program is from the brand’s already-existing REMS
program, evidence of the brand firm’s bad faith, evidence of the
generic firm’s good faith, and additional alleged anticompetitive
behavior.304
One example that would appear to fail the no-economic-
sense test is provided by In re Suboxone Antitrust Litigation.305
In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that in a setting in which the
FDA “contemplated rapid development of a shared REMS”306
since the brand’s “own previously-approved Suboxone REMS
could be amended to add generic manufacturers in a relatively
short time,”307 the brand (1) “turned down numerous invita-
tions to participate in meetings” and “refused to engage in sub-
300 See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. R
301 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 116. R
302 Id.
303 Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012, supra note 65, at 1:03:09 R
(testimony of Janet Woodcock, Dir., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. For Drug
Evaluation & Research).
304 Evidence relevant to these factors appears in examples offered in this sec-
tion.  For an argument that shared REMS do not require significant changes to
brand REMS, see CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 2:17:10–46 (testimony of R
Beth Zelnick Kaufman) (“[O]nce a REMS is in place, that means the FDA and the
innovator have already decided the details” of the program, with “[t]he mystery . . .
gone” and “[a]ll of the secrets . . . out” and “on a piece of paper,” which leaves only
the task of “find[ing] a way to change that program . . . from a single-source supply
to a multi-source supply,” which generic firms have been doing “for 32 years since
Hatch-Waxman”).
305 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
306 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 51,
In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (No. 2:13-md-
02445-MSG).
307 Id. ¶ 53 (noting that FDA had recently approved brand REMS).
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stantive discussions until the [g]enerics agreed to a number of
[allegedly unfavorable] conditions”; (2) “refused to share non-
public information from its REMS program until its demands
were met”; (3) “refused to cooperate unless the [g]enerics agreed
to provide Reckitt veto authority or a super-majority vote on all
issues relating to the SSRS”; and (4) “[took] unreasonable posi-
tions and utilized delay tactics to keep [g]enerics off of the
market for as long as possible.”308  Another example is pro-
vided by the negotiation between Jazz Pharmaceuticals and
generics concerning the narcolepsy drug Xyrem, for which the
FDA waived the requirement of an SSRS given the parties’ in-
ability to agree to terms, which was “likely to further delay the
approval” of a generic version of the drug.309  The FDA also has
waived shared REMS after an unsuccessful three-year
negotiation.310
Conduct similar to that in Suboxone and Jazz most likely
would fail the no-economic-sense test.  In particular, conduct
could lack economic sense for reasons relating to safety, cost-
sharing, and IP licensing.  First, brands have highlighted safety
concerns arising from generics’ creation of their own REMS
programs.311  For example, Jazz argued against a waiver of a
shared system on the grounds that such a waiver would “im-
pact patient safety” since “without access to all of the data,
Jazz would lose the ability to ensure that the pharmacy has all
of the data necessary to monitor for overlapping prescriptions,
review for potentially interacting agents that are unknown to
the prescriber, and review [indicators] regarding potential mis-
308 Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 675, 687. See also Memorandum from U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. on the Decision to Waive the Requirement for a Single,
Shared System REMS for Buprenorphine-Containing Transmucosal Products
(Feb. 22, 2013) (submitted to ANDA 090819 et al., Feb. 22, 2013) (referencing
Subutex (buprenorphine) and Suboxone (buprenorphine and naloxone)).
309 Memorandum from Trueman W. Sharp, Deputy Dir., Office of Bioe-
quivalence, to Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) for Sodium Oxybate
Oral Solution Products at 13 (Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Sharp Memorandum].
310 Memorandum from U.S. Food & Drug Admin. on the Decision to Waive the
Requirement for a Single, Shared System REMS for Alosetron Products at 12 n.41
(May 4, 2015).  Guidance also could come from legislation such as the CREATES
Act, which provides that negotiations for shared REMS must occur within 120
days.  S. 3056, 114th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B) (2016); see also id. § 3(b)(1)(D) (providing
that if brands do not provide samples on “commercially reasonable, market-based
terms,” the generic could, in addition to obtaining the sample, receive attorneys’
fees and other damages). Id.  For a critique of the CREATES Act, see Erika
Lietzan, A Second Look at the CREATES Act: What’s Not Being Said, 17 FED. SOC’Y
REV., Oct. 2016, at 38, 48–50.
311 For a critical analysis of brands’ safety-based claims, see infra subpart V.C.
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use, abuse, or diversion.”312  Brands wishing to exercise more
control and oversight over generic REMS programs naturally
would find it in their interest to negotiate in good faith to expe-
ditiously complete a shared REMS.  For brand firms that have
voiced safety concerns, a failure to negotiate a shared REMS
makes no economic sense other than by delaying generic entry.
Second is the potential for cost sharing.  When multiple
sponsors are involved, the FDA requires the parties to negotiate
for shared REMS programs, which promise to “[r]educe[ ] [the]
burden for different stakeholders” through a “single portal to
access materials and other documentation and information
about the program” and to allow “prescribers, pharmacies, and
healthcare settings [to] complete certification and other admin-
istrative requirements once rather than for each individual
drug.”313  As a benefit of a shared REMS system, the FDA also
has pointed to the “[p]otential for cost sharing among all spon-
sors.”314  To the extent, then, that the brand delays negotiating
the SSRS, it could increase its costs in a way that makes sense
only because of delayed generic competition.
Third, similar to their denial of sales of samples in a man-
ner that makes no economic sense,315 brands could be leaving
money on the table by not entering into profitable licensing
arrangements with generics.  One of the grounds on which the
FDA can waive the requirement of a shared REMS is that the
generic shows that “it has sought a license for use of an aspect
of the elements to assure safe use for the applicable listed
drug” but “was unable to obtain a license.”316  If that attempt
includes an offer to pay at least a reasonable royalty, a brand
could be refusing to negotiate in good faith.  This would not
make sense if not for its effect in impairing generic competition.
A lack of good-faith negotiation also could form part of a
larger scheme of anticompetitive behavior.317  Such behavior,
312 Sharp Memorandum, supra note 309, at 18 (quoting Letter in opposition to R
potential waiver of the SSS requirement (Dec. 4, 2015)).
313 Elaine Lippmann, Office of Regulatory Policy, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Address at the GPhA Fall Technical Confer-
ence: Development of Single, Shared System REMS 6 (Oct. 26, 2016).
314 Id.
315 See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text. R
316 FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (i)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2016).
317 See, e.g., Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
699 (1962) (“[P]laintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without
tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate
clean after scrutiny of each.”); LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir.
2003) (“[C]ourts must look to the monopolist’s conduct taken as a whole rather
than considering each aspect in isolation.”); In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 649 F.
Supp. 2d 340, 359 (D.N.J. 2009) (“If a plaintiff can allege that a series of actions,
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together with some combination of patent-related fraud, sham
litigation, settlements, “product hopping,” and “citizen peti-
tions,” could increase the likelihood of an antitrust violation.318
In settings in which evidence relating to a shared REMS alone
is ambiguous, consideration of a more expansive array of the
brand’s behavior could provide useful guidance.
In short, brand conduct in the shared REMS setting can
violate the antitrust laws just as the denial of samples can.
This conclusion on antitrust liability in both settings is
strengthened by the consideration, and rebuttal, of the primary
justifications that brands have offered for their conduct.
V
REBUTTAL OF JUSTIFICATIONS
Brand firms have vigorously contested antitrust liability for
REMS-related behavior.  This Part rebuts the four justifications
on which the brands have most frequently relied.  The first two
contend, based on the caselaw, that there is no duty to deal
and that, in any event, there is no prior course of dealing be-
tween the parties.  The other two center on business arguments
based on concerns about safety and product liability.
A. Duty to Deal
The brands’ first justification, the most expansive one
under the caselaw, is that they have no duty to deal with gener-
ics.  Actelion contended that it “is under no duty to deal with or
assist its would-be generic competitors,” as the “well-settled
rule of law is subject to narrow and rare exceptions, none of
which applies” to the denial of samples.319  Speaking even more
when viewed together, were taken in furtherance and as an integral part of a plan
to violate the antitrust laws, that series of actions, as an overall scheme, may
trigger antitrust liability.”); In re Neurontin Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1479, 2009
WL 2751029, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009) (“If an antitrust plaintiff can allege
that a series of actions, when viewed together, were taken in furtherance and as
an integral part of a plan to violate the antitrust laws, that series of actions may
trigger antitrust liability as an overall scheme.”); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 428 (D. Del. 2006) (“Plaintiffs are entitled to claim that
individual acts are antitrust violations, as well as claim[ ] that those acts as a
group have an anticompetitive effect even if the acts taken separately do not.”).
See generally In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2445, 2017 WL 36371, at
*9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2017) (citing cases and finding that conduct during SSRS
process “may be considered as one aspect of the overarching scheme claim”).
318 See HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY, LESLIE, & CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST, supra
note 203, ch. 15 (providing details on causes of action). R
319 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings and to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2, Actelion Pharms. Ltd. v. Apotex,
Inc.,  Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-05743 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2012), ECF No. 44-1.
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broadly, it asserted that “[t]his right to choose with whom to do
business—and to choose not to do business with a rival—is a
cornerstone of America’s free enterprise system, and is consis-
tent with basic free market principles.”320  Continuing the
theme of hyperbole, Celgene asserted that even if its “insistence
on appropriate procedures and guarantees were not motivated
by the safety of fetuses and the survival of its business, anti-
trust law still would not require it to deal with its potential
rivals.”321
To be sure, the Trinko Court was skeptical of refusal-to-
deal cases, stating that “as a general matter, the Sherman Act
‘does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or man-
ufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal.’”322  On the other hand, the “high value” that the
Court “placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms
does not mean that the right is unqualified.”323 “Under certain
circumstances,” the Court continued, “a refusal to cooperate
with rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate
[Section] 2.”324  While there might not be a general duty in
many contexts, several factors presented by the combination of
the unique pharmaceutical regulatory setting and conduct that
fails the no-economic-sense test suggest an exception for
REMS behavior.
First, the facts of REMS denials, with readily-available
samples, resemble those of cases in which the Supreme Court
has found liability.  The Court in Trinko found that the defend-
ants in the Aspen Skiing and Otter Tail cases offered ski lift
tickets and power transmission, respectively, which were al-
ready available to the public.325  By contrast, Verizon was re-
quired to share unbundled network elements, a “brand new”
service “exist[ing] only deep within [Verizon’s] bowels” that it
320 Id. at 12.
321 Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss at
4, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182222 (D.N.J.
May 25, 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH); see also Koren Wong-Ervin, Does
Aspen Skiing Apply to Intellectual Property Rights?, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
IP COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER, Summer 2013, at 7 (“Forcing a patent holder to sell
generic companies samples of its patented drug would be unprecedented.”).
322 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)).
323 Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585, 601 (1985)).
324 Id.
325 Id. at 410.
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“offered not to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable
expense and effort.326  For REMS programs that the FDA re-
quires after the drug is already on the market, by definition the
product is available.  And even when a sample is requested
before approval, the brand is in the business of producing
drugs, and the provision of a sample after the drug is manufac-
tured does not require additional effort.327
Second, the REMS-related conduct discussed above328
makes no economic sense absent the impairment of generic
competition.   The Court in Aspen Skiing found exclusionary
conduct where a defendant was “willing to sacrifice short-run
benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived
long-run impact on its smaller rival.”329  In contrast, the Trinko
Court denied liability where Verizon could obtain only a “cost-
based rate of compensation.”330  Brands refusing to sell sam-
ples lose the opportunity to obtain at least a market (and some-
times significantly higher) price for samples.331
Third is the ineffectiveness of the regulatory regime.  The
Trinko Court underscored the importance of regulation in the
setting of the Telecommunications Act, which was effectively
enforced through financial penalties, daily or weekly reporting
requirements, and the suspension or revocation of long-dis-
tance approval.332  In contrast, antitrust has a role to play
given that the REMS regime is not working as intended, with an
ineffective FDA unable to fix the problem and eager to punt
competition issues to the FTC, carving out a role for
antitrust.333
Finally, compelled dealing raises three concerns that the
Trinko Court lamented but that are not present here.  First, the
Court worried that sharing “may lessen the incentive for the
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in [their] economically
326 Id.
327 See supra note 280 and accompanying text. R
328 See supra Part IV.
329 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11
(1985).
330 540 U.S. at 409.
331 See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text; see generally HOVENKAMP, R
JANIS, LEMLEY, LESLIE, & CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 203, ch. 15.03(B) R
(“While monopolists have no general duty to help their competitors, they do have
an obligation to refrain from acts that have no purpose or effect except to exclude
competition.”).
332 See Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 412–14.
333 See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of Con- R
gress’s attempts to avoid the blocking of generic competition and Senators’ frus-
tration with how REMS programs have been misused, see supra notes 55–61 and R
accompanying text.
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beneficial facilities.”334  But here there are not material effects
on incentives that need to be accounted for since a central
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act involves generics experi-
menting on drugs before the end of the patent term and pig-
gybacking on brand studies.335  The legislative history makes
clear that “experimental activity does not have any adverse
economic impact on the patent owner’s exclusivity during the
life of a patent” and that “prevention of such activity would
extend the patent owner’s commercial exclusivity beyond the
patent expiration date.”336  In addition, Congress anticipated
that “the benefits to the government and the general citizenry
[would] be substantial” from the experimental-use provision
and that, as a result, “generic drugs [would] be able to be
placed on the market between 18 months and 2 years earlier
than without this provision,” which would “assist in the reduc-
tion of health care costs,” which was of particular “importan[ce]
to the poor, the under-insured, and the elderly.”337
The second concern, that sharing “requires antitrust
courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are
ill suited,”338 also does not apply.  A one-time sale of a sample
does not implicate such planning, and even a shared REMS
program will not require judicial coordination, at worst devolv-
ing into separate REMS controlled by the brand and generic.
Third, the concern that “compelling negotiation between
competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collu-
sion”339 is absent.  Again, a one-time sale does not threaten
such collusion.  And the brands’ and generics’ different incen-
tives—with brands seeking to delay generic entry and generics
334 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
335 See Carrier, Unsettling Settlements, supra note 141, at 43–45 (discussing R
enhanced innovation incentives through patent term extensions, nonpatent mar-
ket exclusivity, and an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval).
336 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2679; see also id. (“Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution em-
powers Congress to grant exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time” and
such a time “should be a definite time,” followed by “immediate competition”).
337 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 29–30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2713–14 (noting that “the nature of the interference with
patent rights . . . is necessitated by the very nature of the industry” and that
Congress “has merely done what [it] has traditionally done in the area of intellec-
tual property law[:] balance the need to stimulate innovation against the goal of
furthering the public interest”).
338 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
339 Id.
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seeking expedited entry—significantly reduce the possibility of
collusion.340
B. Prior Dealing
Defendants have offered a second, narrower argument
against compelling dealing with generics: that a refusal-to-deal
claim requires a prior course of dealing between the parties.
Celgene, for example, has contended that there is an “affirma-
tive duty to deal with competitors” only when two requirements
are satisfied, one of which is “a prior course of dealing between
the parties.”341  And Actelion’s counsel asserted that “it’s fairly
well established that . . . prior profitable course of dealing is
th[e] dividing line . . . on a refusal to deal case[ ] between a
legitimate refusal to deal . . . and the kind of fairly egregious
conduct at the outer bounds of Section 2 liability.”342
A careful reading of the caselaw, however, reveals that a
prior course of dealing is not a prerequisite for a refusal-to-deal
claim.  The classic case of Otter Tail343 imposed a duty to deal
where there was no prior course of dealing,344 with Trinko’s
citation of the case affirming its continued validity.345  In addi-
tion, the course of dealing in Trinko involved (1) a voluntary
relationship that was (2) “presumably profitable.”346  Of course,
prior dealing could show the abandonment of a profitable reve-
nue stream in a voluntary relationship, offering evidence of a
lack of economic sense.  But such a set of facts is not needed
for this conclusion.  In other words, a previous, ongoing rela-
tionship is sufficient, but not necessary, to show conduct that
lacks economic sense.
Several courts that have examined the issue in the context
of REMS denials have understood prior dealing as one (but not
the only) setting in which exclusionary conduct could be
demonstrated.  In its hearing on a motion to dismiss, the court
in Apotex v. Actelion found that the classic Aspen Skiing case
presented facts other than a prior course of dealing (including a
340 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. R
341 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 10.  Showing the broad ac- R
ceptance of the no-economic-sense test, the other requirement was that “the
alleged monopolist irrationally forsook short-term profits for long-term anticom-
petitive gain—in other words, its actions made ‘no economic sense.’” Id.
342 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 27. R
343 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 392–95 (1973).
344 See Creighton & Jacobson, supra note 202, at 53. R
345 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 10, 17. R
346 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409 (emphasis in original).
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“refusal to sell at retail”) that provided evidence of anticompeti-
tive conduct.347  Similarly, the court in Mylan v. Celgene stated
that Third Circuit cases had found that prior dealing is “rele-
vant but not dispositive” and that even though “Mylan essen-
tially admits that it has not pled a prior course of dealing
between the parties,” it alleged a “plausible Section 2 claim”348
because it “pled other facts to demonstrate that the defendant’s
actions were motivated only by long-term anticompetitive
gain.”349
The setting of denied samples shows how a prior-dealing
requirement is not appropriate.  The reason is that there typi-
cally will not be such a relationship between the parties.  REMS
programs involve new drugs that have not previously been on
the market, precluding a preexisting relationship between the
brand and generic.  The generic, by definition, is seeking a
sample of the drug to enter the market.  Because the sale of
samples is likely to be a one-time event, if the generic had
previously engaged with the brand, it would not need a sample.
Nor is the conclusion different for shared REMS systems.  A
generic attempting to use a single shared REMS also is seeking
to enter the market for the first time, which precludes a prior
relationship with the brand.
Generics’ need for samples to engage in bioequivalence
testing is at the core of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDAAA,
and fifty state substitution laws.  Requiring a prior course of
dealing in a setting in which a generic is seeking samples so it
can reach the market for the first time makes no sense.
In fact, a prior-dealing hurdle would privilege a particular
set of facts.  As Judge Posner has explained, it would be “per-
verse” to make the “encouraging gestures” of a prior course of
dealing “the fulcrum of an antitrust violation.”350  To the con-
trary, the “essential feature” of a refusal-to-deal case is “a mo-
nopoly supplier’s discriminati[on] against a customer because
the customer has decided to compete with it.”351  A prior course
347 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 13–14. R
348 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 13, 17. R
349 Id. at 15.  To the contrary, the court in Suboxone neglected Otter Tail and
restrictively interpreted Aspen Skiing, finding it to be “the only Supreme Court
case recognizing a failure to deal as anticompetitive” and contending that it did
not apply because of the absence of a “long-standing, preexisting course of deal-
ing.” In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 687 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
350 Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th
Cir. 1986); see generally Federal Trade Comm’n’s Brief as Amicus Curiae, Mylan
Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., supra note 263, at 13 (describing concerns with R
requirement based on prior course of dealing).
351 Olympia Leasing, 797 F.2d at 377.
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of dealing reveals that sales are possible—in fact that they
occurred.  But a request by a generic to buy a sample at the
market rate removes the facts from a hypothetical setting and
places them in the real-world context in which the brand has a
clear opportunity for profit.  A brand’s refusal should not be
immunized because of the absence of a particular set of facts in
a setting in which those facts, by definition, are not likely to be
present.
C. Safety
In addition to arguments based on the caselaw, defendants
have offered business arguments based on concerns about ge-
neric safety and (as shown below352) increased exposure to
product liability claims.  Celgene, for example, contended that
the sale of samples imposed safety concerns as the “ingestion
of . . . two teratogenic drugs [which produce birth defects] by
unknown, healthy subjects entails risk of fetal exposure, which
is why Mylan discusses its safety measures at length” and
“need not accept others’ conclusions that . . . these measures
are adequate.”353  In a different case, Celgene “question[ed] the
efficacy” of the generic’s “study protocol’s safety.”354  And Acte-
lion explained that it “has an obvious and legitimate commer-
cial interest to make sure that its liability, reputational issues,
and concerns are taken into account and are dealt with.”355
In fact, brands’ concerns that a generic’s use of samples
automatically poses a heightened risk for which they would be
responsible are misplaced.  Use does not occur in a vacuum.
The FDA ensures the safety of not only brand drugs but also
generics.  The agency tightly regulates the use of samples, in-
cluding through clinical trials.356  As a generic official has ex-
plained, “merely having a sample doesn’t mean a company has
unfettered discretion to use it improperly, to have poor clinical
trials, [or] to expose their employees to risk” since the FDA
“continues to monitor what happens to that sample.”357  In
addition, safety concerns are significantly reduced as many of
352 See infra subpart V.D.
353 Brief of Celgene Corp., supra note 321, at 17. R
354 Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., Civil Action No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011).
355 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 100. R
356 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 1:49:11 (testimony of Beth Zelnick R
Kaufman); see also Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 66 (generics R
must “submit adverse events reports to FDA”).
357 CREATES Act Hearing, supra note 4, at 1:49:11 (testimony of Beth Zelnick R
Kaufman).
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the samples are used for lab testing rather than on humans.358
Roxane’s attorney explained that generics “have been buying
samples and using them for years and years and years, of both
REMS-covered and non-REMS-covered drugs, and there has
never been some parade of horribles in terms of a brand being
forced to come in and monitor what we’re doing.”359  Finally,
safety concerns are weakened when brands provide samples to
noncompeting research organizations.360
In Mylan v. Celgene, to offer one example, the FDA ap-
proved the safety protocols that generic firm Mylan put in place
for Revlimid and Thalomid.361  Mylan submitted its Thalomid
protocols to the FDA, which approved them and gave additional
recommendations the generic needed to follow in its studies.362
The FDA also approved Mylan’s Revlimid protocols and then
disclosed its approval to the brand.363
The FDA instituted such a notification process after gener-
ics had expressed concern that REMS programs were prevent-
ing competition.364  In particular, the agency was “aware of
instances” in which a brand “refused to sell drug[s]” to generics
“seeking to conduct the testing needed to obtain approval,”
with the brand “cit[ing] the REMS ETASU as justification.”365
For that reason, generics can request that the FDA send a
statement that makes clear that (1) “[t]he Agency has deter-
mined that the protocols, informed consent documents, and
informational materials contain safety precautions comparable
358 Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, at 58 (“The first round and the R
vast majority of the actual product that you would use as samples are for lab
testing . . . in test tubes and dissolution studies” that do not “involve . . . patients,”
with only a “very small minority” used in the “in vivo study . . . give[n] to patients”).
359 Id. at 65.
360 Id. at 110; In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., Civil No.: 14-6997
(KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 9589217, at *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015).
361 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 5–6, 8–9. R
362 Id. at 5–6.
363 Id. at 8.  Celgene refused to provide samples after the FDA’s approval even
though the company had previously required that Mylan obtain that approval.
364 Ed Silverman, FDA Tries to End Dispute Between Brand-Name and Generic
Drug Makers, WALL ST. J.: PHARMALOT (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/pharmalot/2014/12/04/fda-tries-to-end-dispute-between-brand-name-
and-generic-drug-makers/ [https://perma.cc/4JVG-JLSR]; see also Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment ¶ 33, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. (D.N.J. Oct.
17, 2013), 1:12-cv-05743 (Actelion contends that REMS program prevented sale
because “[u]nder the FDA-mandated REMS program,” it “may not distribute
Tracleer to Apotex, Roxane, or . . . any other entity that does not specifically
qualify under Tracleer’s REMS”).
365 HHS, FDA & CDER REPORT, supra note 46, at 2. R
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to those in the applicable REMS ETASU”366 and that (2) it “will
not consider it a violation of REMS for the RLD sponsor to
provide the designated potential ANDA applicant (or its agent)
[with] a sufficient quantity of drug product to allow it to perform
the testing necessary to support its ANDA and otherwise meet
the requirements for ANDA approval.”367
If brands are not satisfied with the FDA’s oversight of drug
samples, they are not without options.  For starters, a brand’s
development of its own REMS program allows it to exercise
control over the generic REMS program.  The FDA has made
clear that if it “approv[es] a generic drug and there’s a REMS in
place for the innovator drug, the requirements are the same for
the ANDA product.”368  Because brands thus have control over
generic REMS through their own programs, they can imple-
ment the steps they believe are necessary to ensure that a
drug’s benefits outweigh its risks, with their requirements car-
rying over to generics.369
Brands also have control in the shared REMS setting.  In
fact, the lack of good-faith negotiation in this context, with the
FDA unsuccessful in mediating an SSRS in all thirteen cases in
which it attempted to negotiate a resolution, provides an indi-
cation that brands’ safety-related concerns370 might not be
wholly authentic.  The agency has explained that it “approve[s]
drugs with REMS if they are particularly risky” and that
“[w]hen they go generic, the generics also need to have this risk
system around them.”371  And the FDA has made clear that if
366 Id. at 4.  For challenges in obtaining an FDA letter, see Actelion v. Apotex
transcript, supra note 49, at 57, 67 (FDA sometimes “sat on . . . [letter] requests R
for years and never responded to them” and other times would not “review . . .
protocol[s]” because they “already issued a guidance, and when there’s a guidance
already out there, [they] are not going to review individual one-off requests”); id. at
57 (same); id. at 75 (“The FDA does not have a formal process for approving
generic companies’ protocols. . . . The [agency] does not collect any fees.  There are
not any dedicated personnel.  There are no timelines.  There is no set process.
Instead, there is a single staffer . . . [who is] very frustrated”).
367 HHS, FDA & CDER REPORT, supra note 46, at 4. See also In re Thalomid & R
Revlimid Antitrust Litig., Civil No.: 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 9589217, at
*15 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015) (finding “plausible inference” that brand’s reliance on
distribution programs was “pretextual” since it “continued to refuse to deal” even
after generics provided FDA letters indicating that agency would not take action if
Celgene provided samples); compare Actelion v. Apotex transcript, supra note 49, R
at 20–21 (Actelion “would sell” sample upon receiving FDA letter) with id. at 45
(generic contends that after receipt of FDA letter, Actelion responded that “[t]his
changes nothing” and “you don’t get [the sample]”).
368 Toigo, supra note 289, at 42:00. R
369 See BRIEF OVERVIEW, supra note 17, at 4.
370 See supra notes 352–55 and accompanying text. R
371 SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 115 (quoting Dr. Woodcock). R
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generics and brands cannot successfully negotiate shared
REMS, the programs will be “equal.”372
Safety issues are even less relevant for brands’ creation of
their own restricted-distribution protocols not required by the
FDA.  In these cases, even if the FDA does not believe that the
plan is necessary since the drug’s benefits outweigh its risks,
brands still can use the systems to prevent generics from ob-
taining the drug.373  The agency has not been successful in
addressing this problem.  It has “done everything [it] can,” in-
cluding writing letters making clear that “REMS does not re-
quire” restricted programs and “refer[ring] the[ ] [programs] to
[the Federal Trade Commission].”374  Despite this, the agency
“still continue[s] to get complaints from generic companies that
they cannot get a hold of the drug to make the comparison they
need to do.”375
In short, (1) the requirement that generic REMS satisfy the
same requirements as brand REMS, (2) the FDA’s active role in
monitoring generics and providing notifications of safety proto-
cols to brands, and (3) brands’ frequent lack of good-faith nego-
tiations concerning shared REMS demonstrate that safety is
not a legitimate justification for refusing to provide samples or
cooperate in shared REMS programs.376
D. Product Liability
Brand firms also have defended their refusal to provide
samples to generics on the grounds of product liability.377
Celgene, for example, has contended that its sale of samples
would impose heightened risks, stating that it “would face in-
372 Id. at 116. See also Lippmann, supra note 313, at 16 (“FDA may waive the R
requirement for a SSS and permit the ANDA to use a ‘different, comparable aspect’
of the ETASU”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 505-1(i) (Supp. 2016)) (emphasis in original);
id. at 17 (generic REMS have “[s]ame goals” and “[s]ame ETASU,” which
“[c]ontain[s] the same elements” and “[m]ust achieve [the] same level of safety”);
Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. FDA-2013-P-0572, at 6 (Oct. 7, 2013) (stating that
brand and generic firms in SSRS “have been subject to the same ETASU, imple-
mentation system, and assessments”).
373 See SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 115; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & R
HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, TRAN-
SCRIPT OF RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY (REMS) PUBLIC MEETING 268
(2010)  (asserting that generics cannot determine if restricted distribution system
is required by FDA).
374 See SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES, supra note 61, at 115 R
375 Id.
376 Safety-based defenses also are not supported by caselaw that rejects the
undermining of the competition regime. See infra notes 389–96 and accompany- R
ing text.
377 A related argument is that brands would suffer reputation harms from
generic conduct. See, e.g., Fabish, supra note 261. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 57 15-NOV-17 14:39
2017] SHARING, SAMPLES, AND GENERICS 57
creased exposure to products liability suits for sales to generic
ANDA filers,” as “[s]ome courts have accepted the notion that a
branded drug manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused
by the generic drug it did not sell.”378  Celgene also worried that
“Mylan makes lengthy allegations regarding its willingness to
indemnify Celgene” while noting that “Celgene is not required
to accept these risks even with indemnification.”379  In a sepa-
rate case, Celgene complained that a proposed generic insur-
ance policy “has inadequate limits of liability and does not
cover human clinical trials.”380  Relatedly, in the SSRS context,
brand firm Reckitt “reportedly turned down numerous invita-
tions to participate in meetings with the Generics . . . until the
Generics agreed to a number of conditions . . . including ‘an
upfront agreement that all manufacturers would share the
costs of product liability for future potential lawsuits.’”381
Most fundamentally, such claims are not consistent with
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which antitrust must be “attuned to”
and take “careful account” of.382  As discussed above,383 ge-
neric access to samples during the patent term was an essen-
tial aspect of the regime, allowing generics to avoid replicating
clinical studies.  Allowing brands to deny samples based on
product-liability (or safety) justifications would undermine the
carefully balanced tradeoff between competition and innova-
tion at the heart of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  In particular, it
would give brands protection beyond the powerful incentives
they received, including patent term extensions, nonpatent
market exclusivity, and an automatic thirty-month stay for fil-
ing a lawsuit.384
Nor is the centrality of samples to the Hatch-Waxman Act
diminished in any way by the FDAAA, as this legislation never
anticipated a separate testing regime for drugs subject to
REMS.385  Excuses based on product liability or safety could,
in contravention of the statute, lead to the “block[ing] or de-
378 Brief of Defendant Celgene Corp., supra note 321, at 17. R
379 Id.
380 Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., Civil Action No. 08–3920, 2011 WL 1193912,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011).
381 In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
382 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411 (2004).
383 See supra notes 226–35 and accompanying text. R
384 Carrier, Unsettling Settlements, supra note 141, at 43–45, 62. R
385 Tucker et al., supra note 221, at 77.  Relatedly, ETASU measures were R
designed to “minimize the burden on the health care delivery system” and “not be
unduly burdensome on patient access to the drug.”  FDAAA, 21 U.S.C. § 355-
1(f)(2)(C, D) (Supp. 2016).
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lay[ing]” of generic competition.386  The FDAAA also did not
envision a redefinition of responsibilities by which brands
could shield themselves from product-liability or safety claims.
In fact, the legislative history reveals a concern that REMS
programs could be used to preempt state product-liability law-
suits.387  The drafters explained that “[t]he additional regula-
tion of pharmaceutical products proposed in this legislation is
an effort to provide consumers with increased protection, not
an effort to provide pharmaceutical manufacturers with immu-
nity from liability when their products harm consumers.”388
If a refusal to provide samples could be justified on prod-
uct-liability or safety grounds, a central pillar of the Hatch-
Waxman Act  would be undermined.  For a brand firm could
always offer such excuses, preventing access to the samples
on which the Act was based.  Such arguments also are under-
cut by Supreme Court decisions rejecting attempts to under-
mine the competition regime.  In National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States,389 the Court consid-
ered an ethics code that prohibited competitive bidding to
“minimiz[e] the risk that competition would produce inferior
engineering work endangering the public safety.”390  The Court
made clear that such a ban “imposes the [association’s] views
of the costs and benefits of competition on the entire market-
place” and that any attempt to justify such a ban “on the basis
of the potential threat that competition poses to the public
safety and the ethics of its profession is nothing less than a
frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”391  The
Court concluded that recognition of an exception for projects
affecting safety “would be tantamount to a repeal of the stat-
ute” and that courts “cannot indirectly protect the public
against this harm by conferring monopoly privileges on the
manufacturers.”392
386 See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text. R
387 H.R. REP. No. 110-225, at 197 (2007).
388 Id.  See also 153 CONG. REC. S11831–32 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2007) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy) (“By enacting this legislation, we do not intend to alter
existing state law duties imposed on a drug manufacturer to obtain and disclose
information regarding drug safety hazards either before or after a drug receives
FDA approval or labeling” since “[w]e do not believe that the regulatory scheme
embodied in this act is comprehensive enough to preempt the field or every aspect
of state law.”).
389 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
390 Id. at 681.
391 Id. at 695.
392 Id. at 695–96.
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Similarly, the Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Indi-
ana Federation of Dentists393 rejected an attempt by dentists to
refuse to submit x-rays to insurers for use in benefit determi-
nations.394  The Court held that such a refusal, which would
“lead to the reduction of costs through the selection of inade-
quate treatment,” is not appropriate because “[t]he argument
is, in essence, that an unrestrained market in which consum-
ers are given access to the information they believe to be rele-
vant to their choices will lead them to make unwise and even
dangerous choices.”395  Explaining the broad applicability of
the Engineers decision, the Court found “no particular reason
to believe that the provision of information [would] be more
harmful to consumers in the market for dental services than in
other markets.”396
In addition to attempting to circumvent the Hatch-Wax-
man Act, brands’ concerns about product liability overstate
plaintiffs’ success in holding them accountable for harms
caused by generics.  In this setting, plaintiffs’ allegations take
the form of a failure to warn consumers about drug risks.397
But as the American Law Reports (“ALR”) explains, “[u]nder
traditional liability theories, a manufacturer of a product is not
liable for injuries to a user of another manufacturer’s prod-
uct.”398  For that reason, “most courts hold that a manufac-
turer has no duty to warn consumers about the risks of using
another manufacturer’s product, and therefore have rejected
actions seeking to hold a name brand manufacturer of a pre-
scription drug liable for injuries sustained by a consumer of a
generic version of the drug on theories of products liability.”399
The ALR has collected cases in which consumers injured by
393 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
394 Id. at 465–66.
395 Id. at 463.
396 Id.
397 In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., Civil No.: 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW)
2015 WL 9589217, at *16 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015).  The bioequivalence testing itself
typically does not expose brands to product liability claims because it “generally
[does] not require[ ] . . . clinical (human) data.” Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA): Generics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Devel
opmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplica
tions/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ [https://perma.cc/PEW
6-U45U] (last updated Feb. 27, 2017).
398 Kenneth Sills, Annotation, Liability of Name Brand Drug Manufacturer for
Injury or Death Resulting from Use of Prescription Drug’s Generic Equivalent, 56
A.L.R. 6TH 161 (2010), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4be255e7-
0355-4edf-b732-0e79c5bfc37a/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/K2FW-
ZW5L].
399 Id. at 2.
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consuming a generic product were not able to hold the brand
manufacturer liable in Alabama,400 Arkansas,401 California,402
Colorado,403 Florida,404 Georgia,405 Kentucky,406 Louisiana,407
Massachusetts,408 Minnesota,409 Nevada,410 New York,411
North Carolina,412 Oklahoma,413 Pennsylvania,414 Texas,415
Utah,416 and West Virginia.417  To similar effect, the Sixth Cir-
cuit, “[a]fter conducting a state-by-state . . . analysis [under
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] . . . conclude[d]
that the highest courts in each of the 22 implicated states
would not recognize Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims under
their respective state laws.”418
400 Barnhill v. Teva Pharms., Civil Action No. 06-0282-CB-M, 2007 WL
5787186 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007).
401 Bell v. Pfizer, Inc., 716 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2013); Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc.,
720 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2013); Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D.
Ark. 2009).
402 LeBeau v. Roxane Labs., No. D039956, 2003 WL 21054640 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 12, 2003).
403 Sheeks v. Am. Home Prods., No. 02CV337, 2004 WL 4056060 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Oct. 15, 2004).
404 Howe v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-610-T-17AEP, 2010 WL 1708857 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 26, 2010).
405 Swicegood v. Pliva, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
406 Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420, 423–24 (6th Cir 2011) (“The plaintiffs’
argument—that the name-brand defendants’ liability stems from the fact that the
regulatory structure governing name-brand and generic drugs makes it foresee-
able that patients and their physicians will rely on the name-brand labels to use
and prescribe generic drugs—has been rejected by all but one of the courts that
have considered it.”); Franzman v. Wyeth, Inc., 451 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
2014).
407 Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-0854, 2009 WL 4064103 (W.D.
La. Nov. 23, 2009).
408 Kelly v. Wyeth, Inc., No. Civ.A.MICV200303314B, 2005 WL 4056740
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2005).
409 Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2009).
410 Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00396-JCM-(GWF), 2009 WL 749532
(D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2009).
411 Goldych v. Eli Lilly, 66 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 799 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
412 Stoddard v. Wyeth, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 631 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
413 Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
414 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
415 Cousins v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-0310-N, 2009 WL
648703 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2009).
416 Beutella v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 980502372, 2001 WL 35669202 (Utah
Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 2001).
417 Meade v. Parsley, Civil Action No. 2:09-cv-00388, 2009 WL 3806716 (S.D.
W. Va. Nov. 13, 2009).
418 In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig., 756 F.3d 917,
939 (6th Cir. 2014); see also id. (“Every circuit court of appeals that has ad-
dressed the issue is in accord” that generic consumers cannot sue brand manu-
facturers for injuries caused by generic drugs).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 61 15-NOV-17 14:39
2017] SHARING, SAMPLES, AND GENERICS 61
Several examples reveal the lack of product liability con-
cern.  In Cousins v. Wyeth Pharmaceutical,419 the court rejected
a product-liability claim against a brand manufacturer for inju-
ries incurred by consuming a generic version, holding that
there was no duty because (1) the brand firm “did not design,
manufacture, or sell the [generic] product” to the consumer
and thus “owed no legal duty” and (2) in the absence of such a
duty there could be no liability in tort to the consumer.420  In
Fields v. Wyeth,421 the court rejected the argument that the
brand should be held liable on the grounds that “it was foresee-
able” that doctors prescribing the generic “would rely on infor-
mation” provided by brands, as the court found that such an
argument “attempts to create a duty” on the brand “irrespective
of the company that produced” the drug.422  In Foster v. Ameri-
can Home Products,423 the court explained that “[t]here is no
legal precedent for using a name brand manufacturer’s state-
ments about its own product as a basis for liability for injuries
caused by other manufacturers’ products, over whose produc-
tion the name brand manufacturer had no control.”424  Finally,
rejecting the product-liability argument in the REMS setting,
the court in In re Thalomid and Revlimid Antitrust Litigation425
made clear that “[t]he possibility that [a brand] could be liable
for a generic drug’s harm is . . . not a legitimate justification
that would support its refusal to supply generic manufacturers
with samples.”426
Brand liability under a failure-to-warn theory implicates
labeling, but brands and generics “have different federal drug
labeling duties.”427  As the Supreme Court made clear in Wyeth
v. Levine, “through many amendments to [pharmaceutical] reg-
ulations, it has remained a central premise of federal drug
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility for the
content of its label at all times” and that “[i]t is charged both
with crafting an adequate label and with ensuring that its
warnings remain adequate as long as the drug is on the mar-
419 2009 WL 648703.
420 Id. at *2.
421 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (W.D. Ark. 2009).
422 Id. at 1060.
423 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
424 Id. at 170; see id. (“The premarketing approval scheme Congress estab-
lished for generic equivalents of previously approved drugs cannot be construed
to create liability of a name brand manufacturer when another manufacturer’s
drug has been consumed.”).
425 Civil No. 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 9589217 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015).
426 Id. at *16.
427 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 613 (2011).
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ket.”428  In contrast, a generic is “responsible for ensuring that
its warning label is the same as” that of the brand.429  Because,
by law, a generic’s labeling must be identical to that of the
brand drug,430 a brand controls its own liability.431
If there were any question remaining as to brands’ con-
cerns with product liability, it would be dispelled by brands’
refusal to accept generics’ proposals to indemnify them for prod-
uct liability claims.432  Similar to insurance and self-insurance,
generic indemnification can serve a vital role in managing
brand risk.  But the cases reveal brands’ lack of interest in
such risk management.
In Mylan v. Celgene, for example, Mylan agreed, over the
course of a five-year negotiation for the sale of Thalomid, to
indemnify Celgene for liability resulting from Mylan’s stud-
ies.433  Even at the time of this Article, eight years after the
parties signed an indemnification agreement in April 2009, the
sale had not yet occurred.  And for the sale of Revlimid, Mylan
offered Celgene an executed indemnification agreement and al-
leged that it “requested the purchase of limited Revlimid sam-
ples for bioequivalence testing, offering to pay market value,” to
which Celgene responded with a “voluminous information re-
quest” and rejection of “Mylan’s offer to enter into an indemnifi-
cation agreement, which included nearly every concession to
terms Celgene requested” during earlier negotiations on
Thalomid.434
428 555 U.S. 555, 570–71 (2009). See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2015) (re-
quiring brand to revise label “to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable
evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b)
(2015) (imposing responsibility for post-marketing surveillance on brand); Sup-
plemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Bio-
logics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,605 (Sept. 22, 2008) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, and 814) (noting that brands “continue to have a respon-
sibility under Federal law . . . to maintain their labeling and update the labeling
with new safety information”).
429 Mensing, 564 U.S. at 613; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
430 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
431 The brand also would not be responsible under theories based on the
manufacturing of a generic drug. E.g., In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig.,
Civil No.: 14-6997 (KSH) (CLW), 2015 WL 9589217, at *16 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015);
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 317 n.16 (2008).
432 This refusal also casts doubt on safety-related concerns. See Kellie Lerner,
REMS and Antitrust: Latest Litigation Lessons, ROBINSKAPLAN, June 3, 2015, http:/
/www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/rems-and-antitrust [https://
perma.cc/FZ97-ALM5] (“[A] brand company’s refusal to agree to an indemnifica-
tion would appear to mitigate any argument that its refusal to deal stems from
safety concerns.”).
433 Transcript of Oral Opinion, supra note 85, at 6. R
434 Plaintiff Mylan Pharms.’ Brief, supra note 268, at 13–14. R
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In short, brands have used concerns related to refusals to
deal, a prior course of dealing, safety, and products liability as
justifications for their refusals to sell samples to generics and
participate in shared REMS.  These justifications are not sup-
ported.  If brands’ justifications do not apply, there is no reason
for them to deny samples that it makes economic sense to
provide or refuse to participate in shared REMS programs that
would make sense and address their purported business con-
cerns.  In other words, there is no economic reason for this
conduct in a setting in which generic competition is a founda-
tion of the regulatory regime.  This is a hallmark of a monopoli-
zation violation.
CONCLUSION
An oft-discussed topic today is high drug prices resulting
from the absence of generic competition.  A linchpin to reduced
prices is generics’ ability to access a sample to demonstrate the
equivalence needed to enter the market.  Through abuse of a
regulatory regime intended for a different purpose, brands are
denying necessary samples and not participating in good faith
in shared REMS programs.  Just as concerning, they are justi-
fying this behavior with rationales at odds with the caselaw,
regulations, and economic realities of the industry.
While other pharmaceutical conduct has received more at-
tention, it is time to focus the spotlight on sharing.  For anti-
trust law is well-equipped—in fact is critical given Congress’s
inaction and the FDA’s ineffectiveness—to remedy anticompe-
titive behavior.  In the process, it promises to reduce drug
prices and restore the intended balance of innovation and com-
petition in the pharmaceutical industry.
